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The Principle of Religious Liberty and
the Practice of States: Seek and Ye Shall
Find a Violation of Human Rights
Obligations
Scott Burr's thesis is a valid one. Government agencies in the
West have expressed greater emphasis upon human rights and reli-
gious freedom than ever before. The recent meetings of "Human
Rights Experts" since 1975 are indicative of this point.
If this emphasis is indicative of an improved view of human
dignity and freedom of law, it is also indicative of an increase of
governments' "inhumanity to man, which makes countless (millions)
mourn."
It was the deplorable treatment of prisoners of war and the
disregard for wounded combatants that led to the formulations of
the Geneva Convention of 1864. Subsequent conventions, treaties,
resolutions and accords may lead us to the conclusion that their
affirmations are for human rights because of their violations.
Most of us in the U.S. presume that our country's Constitution
is a universal one that declares the truth about human rights known
to everyone in every culture. Yet, a glance at the history of the past
200 years would seem to uphold a case for the expansion of viola-
tions rather than a decrease of them. Henry Wallace once termed
this century as "the century of the common man." Yet has the com-
mon man ever been treated so cruelly as he has been in every area
of our planet Earth? Along with charters of human rights we have
to acknowledge the reality of tyrants and terrorism, of prison camps
and holocausts, of slavery and Gulags, of dehumanizing bureaucra-
cies and destructive state ideologies. The optimism of 200 years ago
is rarely to be noticed in the mass media of our times. Perhaps the
basic problem was stated by Professor Alexis Pavlov, the Soviet
delegate to a meeting of the United Nations held in Paris in 1948.
He was protesting against the inclusion of the statement, "men are
created in the image and likeness of God." These are the words of
his protest: "In my country the postulate that man is created in the
image of God is much disputed and is sometimes even regarded as
reflecting a certain social backwardness . . . . Freedom and equal-
ity are not inherent by birth but are a product of social structure."
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It is against such a background that we may evaluate the pro-
gress achieved by law since 1948.
Foreword by Rev. Dr. Ernest Gordon*
* Dean Emeritus, Princeton University; President, Christian Rescue Effort for the Eman-
cipation of Dissidents (Creed); Member, Ethics Advisory Committee of the United States In-




0 God, the heathen have come into thy inheritance; they
have defiled thy holy temple; they have laid Jerusalem in ruins.
They have given the bodies of thy servants to the birds of
the air for food, the flesh of thy saints to the beasts of the
earth.
They have poured out their blood like water round about
Jerusalem, and there was none to bury them.'
I. Introduction
On January 6, 1983, Soviet KGB agents searched the home of
Baptist youth leader Janis Rozkalns and found more than forty Bi-
bles, various religious writings, the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights, a copy of the Helsinki Final Act, and a letter from a
Swedish Bible Society. Rozkalns was arrested. An attorney from a
human rights watchgroup was sent to Riga, Latvia to observe the
trial and to protest against what appeared to be the inevitable sen-
tencing of Rozkalns to prison, despite a provision in the Soviet Con-
stitution that guarantees freedom of religion.2 The trial was post-
poned until after the lawyer had left. A British attorney attempting
to attend the re-scheduled trial was denied a visa by the Soviet Em-
bassy. Rozkalns was convicted of anti-Soviet agitation and propa-
ganda in, what local Christians termed, a "show trial," which was
broadcast on Soviet television and widely reported in the press. He
was sentenced to five years in a strict regime labor camp and three
years internal exile.3
In January 1984, Rozkalns was sent to Perm Camp 37 in Sibe-
ria. The 2,600 mile trip took nearly three months as he passed from
one holding cell to another during the transit. Formerly a tuberculo-
sis patient, he arrived at the camp a gravely ill man suffering from
acute pneumonia."
Despite the deprivations and punishments endured, Rozkalns
struggled for human rights and religious freedom, even while impris-
oned. Because of these activities and the fact that he was unable to
fulfill his work quota, due to ill health, Rozkalns has spent a total of
six months in isolation cells. Contrary to Soviet law, he has been
deprived of packages sent by relatives. Those that he has received
were withheld for almost three months until the food contents had
rotted. Medicines taken to him by his wife have been confiscated.
1. A Psalm of Asaph, Psalm 79:1-3.
2. See infra note 181.
3. Response, Jan.-Feb., 1987, at 1, col. 1. Response is a publication of Christian Re-
sponse International (CRI), the U.S. national affiliate of Christian Solidarity International,
Zurich, Switzerland. The organization monitors religious rights throughout the world and acts
on behalf of prisoners of conscience.
4. Id. at 2, col. I.
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Recently, in a letter to his wife, Rozkalns asked her to tell his two
infant children "the whole truth - where I am, why and for what
reason. It doesn't matter that they are little, for this is the world
they, too, will have to live in for a time."'
It is the gruesome tales of human beings like Janis Rozkalns,
who have endured great hardship because of their religious beliefs,
that have compelled one observer to declare that the "twentieth cen-
tury is pre-eminently the century of religious persecution." Indeed,
for citizens throughout the world, manifestation of religious beliefs
can be hazardous. In the 1980s, governments imprison, torture, and
even execute people because of their religious beliefs or affiliations,
despite prohibitions against religious intolerance embodied in both
domestic and international law.
The roots of this religious intolerance are complex and varied,
but often have-a political dimension.' Some governments seek to
achieve greater political independence and increase nationalist senti-
ments, and thus wish to sever bonds between domestic religious
groups and foreign branches and leaders.' To accomplish this end,
some governments assume powers to approve candidates for positions
of religious leadership,9 to control enrollment in religious training in-
stitutions, and to prohibit admission of new members to particular
religions.10 Officials have even declared some religions legal and
some illegal." When majority religious groups align themselves with
government authorities and label minority groups as heretical, they
create a climate for repression. 2 In turn, when minority religious
groups voice opposition to unfair and discriminatory government pol-
icies, the authorities have subjected their leaders and members to
5. Id. at 2, col. 2. The Baptist faith in the Soviet Union has never risen above the status
of an illegal "religious cult." Because of this situation, many Baptists are imprisoned under
circumstances similar to those of Rozkalns. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
6. Weigel, Religion as a Human Right, FREEDOM AT ISSUE 3 (1984).
7. See generally A. KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RE-
LIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/200/Rev. I at V (1960), R.
BUSH, RELIGION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1970); J. COQUIA, CHURCH AND STATE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES (1959); G. MACEOIN. NORTHERN IRELAND: CAPTIVE OF HISTORY 123-44 (1974);
D. MACINNIS. RELIGIOUS POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1972); RELIGION,
POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD (D. Smith ed. 1971); Religious Intoler-
ance, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PUB. POL. 03/03/86 (May 1986) [hereinafter AMNESTY RE-
PORT]; D. SCHMEISER, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CANADA 54-124 (1964); SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS
AND RELIGION (D. Smith ed. 1966); R. VINCENT. FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1986).
8. See, e.g., AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 7 (discusses the steps taken by the
government of the People's Republic of China to control religious affairs and pressure the
churches to sever their links abroad).
9. See, e.g., id. at 8 (discusses the restrictions the government of Czechoslovakia placed
on priests before they can practice).
10. See, e.g., id. (discusses bars to education in Czechoslovakia).
11. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discusses Albania's efforts to become a completely atheist state).
12. See, e.g., infra notes 140-178 and accompanying text.
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severe repression.' s This problem has been called "one of the great
and most urgent challenges now confronting our world.""
This Comment will examine the theological and legal bases for
the claim that religious freedom is a fundamental human right. It
will assess the progress that has been made since 1948 in recogniz-
ing, upholding, and enforcing the rights of all people to practice their
religion, whatever its tenets, whatever their beliefs. Specifically, the-
pertinent international legal instruments that are accepted by the
members of the United Nations will be discussed. Through a com-
parative analysis of the constitution, legislation, and case law of the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Republic of India, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the modern practice of states
will be derived. The weaknesses of the current international law will
be discussed, and proposals for bridging the gap between states' ver-
bal assertions of adherence to international law and their actual con-
duct in the area of religious freedom will be posited.
II. The Principle of Religious Liberty as a Fundamental Human
Right
How long, 0 Lord? Wilt thou be angry for ever? . . .Pour
out thy anger on the nations that do not know thee, and on the
kingdoms that do not call on thy name!"
The concept of religious liberty is a relatively recent phenome-
non in international law. It is rooted in the concept of "liberty of
conscience," a phrase that came into use after the sixteenth century,
and appeared most prominently during the seventeenth, eighteenth,
and nineteenth centuries.' 6 While long advocated by individuals and
by the free churches of the Radical Reformation,' 7 religious liberty
did not become legally guaranteed until the modern era.
The major advance toward religious liberty in the modern world
has not come so much from the Church as from constitutions, legis-
latures, and courts of law. The emergence of new states and a new
national spirit undermined the predominant influence of religious au-
thority in the political as well as the spiritual spheres. Gradually,
13. See, e.g., infra notes 180-215 and accompanying text.
14. Wood Jr., Tolerance and Truth in Religion, 24 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 5, 10
(1982) (quoting Gustav Mensching).
15. Psalm 79:5-6.
16. A. Krishnaswami, supra note 7, at 5-6; M. BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY
485-6 (1945).
17. See generally R. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1952);
M. BATES, supra note 16, at 148-86; 0. CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION (1965); G. ELTON,
REFORMATION EUROPE, 1517-1599 (1964); H. GRIMM, THE REFORMATION ERA, 1500-1650,
588-92 (1954); T. LINDSAY, A HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION (1907); R. POST, THE MODERN
DEVOTION: CONFRONTATION WITH REFORMATION AND HUMANISM (1968); Bainton, The
Struggle for Religious Liberty, 10 CHURCH HIST. 95 (1941).
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religious liberty was proclaimed to be both a natural and divine
right. 8 But the enlightenment philosophy went beyond the achieve-
ment of religious liberty, indeed, it transcended it. What was de-
manded was liberty of conscience, the right to think and act accord-
ing to one's independent judgment. As John Milton said, "Given me
the liberty to know, to think, to believe, and to utter freely, accord-
ing to conscience, above all other liberties."' 9 In the twentieth cen-
tury, churches and states throughout the world have joined together
in supporting religious liberty, at least in principle, as a fundamental
human right.
A. The Theological Basis of the Right
In all international legal instruments setting forth human rights,
no references are made to any theological basis for the existence of
such religious rights. The legal texts and related documents usually
allude to the basis of human rights only be reciting that they are
based on the "inherent dignity of the human person. ' 2 The docu-
ments do not explain why the person has such inherent dignity so as
to justify a claim to religious rights. Indeed, there is not even a theo-
logical reference given for the right to freedom of religion itself.
Theology appears to play only a small part in the process of making
and enforcing international human rights.
Some commentators suggest, however, that without a sound the-
ological basis, a human right to religious freedom can never be effec-
tively realized. 21 The great religions of the world have recognized the
need for a theologically based commitment to such a right in the
nature of mankind, not simply a sociologically or positivistically
rooted right. There is a sense that unless such a right can itself be
grounded beyond human commitments and processes, it will. be an
ephemeral and elusive commitment, subject constantly to the vagar-
18. M. BATES, supra note 16, at 378-473.
19. Id. at 173.
20. See the preambles of the UNITED STATES CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153 (1969) [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER] ("reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person"); UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL DEC-
LARATION] ("recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family"); INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT] ("recognizing that these rights derive
from the inherent dignity of the human person"); INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COVENANT] ("rec-
ognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person").
21. See A. F. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (J. DRURY trans. 1967);
Conde, The Theological Basis for Human Rights, 5 Q 10 (No. 3, 1984); Lorenzen, The Theo-
logical Basis of Religious Liberty: A Christian Perspective, 21 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 415-




ies of capricious legal systems and the wills of states.
In the Declaration on Religious Freedom adopted by the Vati-
can II Council in 1965,22 the Catholic Church pronounced that "the
human person has a right to religious freedom,"' 3 which "has its
foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is
known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself."24
Elaborating on this freedom, the Declaration states that "all men are
to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social
groups and of any human power, in such ways that no one is to be
forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether pri-
vately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within
due limits."' 5 With this Declaration - "an effort of the Church to
catch up with the recognition of a right previously asserted in secu-
lar, Protestant, Jewish and other religious traditions" '  - it has
been observed that "for the first time in many centuries, Christians
are unanimous in formally proclaiming the universality and inviola-
bility of religious freedom. They all agree that it is the right of every
man and every religious confession. 27 A comparable trend is also
observable in the non-Christian world. As one commentator has put
it, "In Judaism, in Islam, in Marxism, and in other religious or secu-
lar movements, there have been formulated claims of ultimate truth
and of the special status that truth entails both for the believer and
the non-believer, on the one hand, and arguments for the freedom of
thought, conscience and religion of all men, on the other. 28
Today there is a recognized theological basis for a claim to a
human right to religious liberty. This foundation is necessary to but-
tress a claim to a legal right. Now that it has been seen that such a
basis exists, the legal concept of religious liberty as a human right in
22. Reprinted in L. JANSSENS, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 145-
60 (Lorenzo trans. 1966) and in A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 21, at 169-87.
23. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 21, at 170; L. JANSSENS, supra note 22, at
146.
24. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 21, at 171; L. JANSSENS, supra note 22, at
147.
25. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 21, at 170-71; L. JANSSENS, supra note 22,
at 146-47.
26. Abram, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, 8 J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS
40, 45-6 (No. 2, 1967).
27. A. CARILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 21, at 155. For the Declarations on Religious
Liberty issued by the World Council of Churches in 1948 and 1961, see id. at 189-99. The
1948 Declaration pronounced at the outset: "The rights of religious freedom herein declared
shall be recognized and observed for all persons without distinction as to race, color, sex, lan-
guage, or religion, and without imposition of disabilities by virtue of legal provision of adminis-
trative acts." Id. at 189-90. It then proceeded to declare that "Every person" has "the right"
to "determine his own faith and creed," to "express his religious beliefs in worship, teaching
and practice, and to proclaim the implications of his beliefs for relationships in a social or
political community," and to "associate with others and to organize with them for religious
purposes." Id. at 190-91.
28. Abram, supra note 26, at 45.
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international law can be examined. Theology and the legal concept
of a human right are not strangers. As Pope John Paul II has pro-
phetically noted, "with the recognition and protection of religious
freedom, the basis is laid for fostering and developing all other
human rights that contribute to guaranteeing the dignity of the
whole human person."29
B. The Legal Basis of the Right
Internationally, the legal status of religious liberty has been for-
warded, both in principle and practice, through diplomatic ex-
changes and the promulgation and ratification of treaties, and con-
ventions among and between states. 30 In the nineteenth century, with
sovereign states identifying with different religious traditions, it be-
came common in the drafting of treaties to include provisions grant-
ing the right of religious expression to nationals of each contracting
party in the territory of the other.3 1 Since these foreign nationals
were often identifiable by both their nationality and religion, it was
inevitable that specific safeguards were provided for freedom of con-
science, worship, and religious work upon the same terms as nation-
als of the state of residence. 3
The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 at the close of the Russo-Turkish
War, with its provisions for equal minorities, is illustrative of the
role that international agreements have played in advancing the
cause of religious liberty.3 Other treaties in the nineteenth and
29. Goldstein, The Pope and Religious Freedom, 82 LIBERTY, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 15
(quoting Pope John Paul Ii from the paper Religious Liberty as a Human Right in the
Thought of John Paul 11, presented at the World Congress on Religious Liberty in Rome,
Italy, Sept. 3-6, 1984).
30. In a major study on religious liberty more than a generation ago, M. Searle Bates
observed, "International law and religious liberty grew in intimate association." M. BATES,
supra note 16, at 485. Bates found that a substantial majority of the writers of general trea-
tises on international law specifically referred to religious liberty in their documents. Id. at
475-76.
31. Id. at 477-84.
32. Id. Krishnaswami noted:
Even before the concepts of freedom of thought, conscience and religion was
recognized in national law - and partly because it had not been so recognized
- the practice envolved of making treaty stipulations ensuring certain rights to
individuals or groups professing a religion or belief different from that of the
majority in the country.
A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 7, at 11.
33. The text of the Treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878, is reprinted in 2 KEY TREA-
TIES FOR THE GREAT POWERS, 1814-1914, at 551-77 (M. Hurst ed. 1972). Pursuant to the
treaty, the newly established states of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and the Sub-
lime Porte undertook to ensure religious freedom to all their inhabitants. Id. Thus in regard to
Bulgaria, the Treaty provided in Article 5:
The difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged
against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to
the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments,
functions, and honours, or the exercise of the various professions and industries
in any locality whatsoever . . ..
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twentieth centuries have provided guarantees of religious liberty and
include: the American Treaty with Japan in 1858;31 the General Act
Relating to African Possessions signed at Berlin in 1885;35 and the
Minorities Treaties of 1919-23.36 An increasing number of states
throughout the world have voluntarily entered into constitutional3 7
and treaty commitments 8 to secure religious liberty for their own
citizens as well as for foreign residents.
I. International Measures.-The contemporary human rights
movement and specifically, the proscription against religious discrim-
ination are chiefly a product of the barbarian excesses of World War
II and, in consequence, the emergent concept that there are "mini-
mum standards of civilized behavior." Because of the War and the
The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship are assured to all
persons belonging to Bulgaria, as well as to foreigners, and no hindrance shall be
offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different communions, or to
their relations with their spiritual chiefs.
Id. at 555-56. Similar provisions were incorporated in Article 27 (regarding Montenegro),
Article 35 (regarding Serbia), and Article 44 (regarding Romania). Id. at 564-71. Additional
obligations were imposed upon the Ottoman Empire in Article 62:
All persons shall be admitted, without distinction of religion, to give evi-
dence before the tribunals;
Ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all nationalities travelling in Turkey in
Europe, or in Turkey in Asia, shall enjoy the same rights, advantages, and privi-
leges ...
The right of official protection by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of
the Powers in Turkey is recognized both as regards the above-mentioned persons
and their religious, charitable, and other establishments in the Holy Places and
elsewhere ....
The monks of Mount Athos, of whatever country they may be natives, shall
be maintained in their former possessions and advantages, and shall enjoy, with-
out exception, complete equality of rights and prerogatives.
Id. at 575.
34. M. BATES, supra note 16, at 487-88.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 82 (K. Vasak ed. 1982).
38. See infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text. In addition to inserting provisos into
peace treaties, states have often inserted provisions guaranteeing religious freedom into bilat-
eral treaties of amity, commerce, and regulation. See M. BATES, supra note 16, at 477-87,
542-43. This type of protection was particularly favored by Great Britain and the United
States. For example, in order to ensure religious freedom for Americans abroad, the United
States included such protective clauses in the treaties of friendship and commerce with the
Netherlands (1972), with Sweden (1782), and with Prussia (1785). Id. at 845. Article 9 of the
treaty with Prussia stipulated: "The most perfect freedom of conscience and of worship is
granted to the citizens or subjects of either party within the jurisdiction of the other, without
being liable to molestation in that respect for any other cause than an insult on the religion of
others." Id. at 485-86.
Comparable protection against religious discrimination was provided for in the bilateral
treaties concluded by the United States with, respectively, China, Japan, Siam, the Congo,
Germany, Ecuador, Honduras, Austria, Norway, Poland, Finland, Liberia, and Iraq. Id. at
479, 486. The protection offered by these treaties was "reciprocal" and extensive, providing for
"freedom of public worship, with due reservation of proper requirements, for foreigners to
enjoy the same rights and benefits as nationals, including residence, travel, and the right to
hold property for religious purposes, with express or implied right to conduct religious, educa-
tional, and philanthropic work." Id. at 486.
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formation of the United Nations, a variety of documents, declara-
tions, and treaties dealing with human rights have been promulgated
and adopted.
a) United Nations Charter.-In those provisions of the United
Nations Charter concerned with discrimination,3 9 religion is consist-
ently specified, along with race, sex, and language, as an impermissi-
ble ground of differentiation.4 The United Nations capacity to pre-
vent such discrimination, .however, is restricted by its lack of power
to enact and enforce laws. Article 2, paragraph 7 states: "Nothing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N. to inter-
vene in any matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any State."4 Article 55(c) and Article 56 impose a duty
upon member signatories to take joint and separate action in cooper-
ation with the organization to promote "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedom for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."'" The Charter
neither includes nor permits the organization to take other measures
to effectuate this duty.'3 Consequently, a citizen's complaint to the
organization or its Human Rights Committee is futile if his State
has failed to provide him in its domestic law with the rights guaran-
teed by the Charter. Currently, no international legal entity exists
that can remedy this infringement of rights."
39. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para. I(b); art. 55(c); art. 62, para. 2; art.
76(c).
40. At the San Francisco Conference of 1945, it was proposed, notably by Latin Ameri-
can delegations, that detailed guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion be incorporated
in the Charter; however, these proposals were not accepted. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 7,
at 12. Instead, by repeatedly employing the familiar formula of "human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion," the Charter
established a more general norm prohibiting discrimination. See Charter provisions, infra note
42. This policy was first implemented in the post-World War II peace treaties concluded in
1947 by the Allied powers with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania. Each state
pledged to undertake "all measures necessary to secure all persons under [its] jurisdiction,
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of
the fundamental freedoms, including freedom . . . of religious worship . . ." TREATY OF
PEACE WITH BULGARIA, Feb. 10, 1947, Art. 2, No. 643, 41 U.N.T.S. 21; TREATY OF PEACE
WITH HUNGARY, Feb. 10, 1947, Art. 2, No. 644, 41 U.N.T.S. 135; TREATY OF PEACE WITH
ROMANIA, Feb. 10, 1947, Art. 3, No. 645, 42 U.N.T.S. 3; TREATY OF PEACE WITH FINLAND,
Feb. 10, 1947, Art. 6, No. 746, 48 U.N.T.S. 203. See also TREATY OF PEACE WITH ITALY,
Feb. 10, 1947, Art. 19(4), No. 747, 49 U.N.T.S. 3 (with a slight variation in wording from the
preceding provisions).
41. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7.
42. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55, para. (c).
43. See P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 51-2 (1983).
Sieghart examines the debate over the binding effect of the Charter. As the constituent statute
of an intergovernmental organization, the U.N. Charter has the status of a multilateral treaty.
Sieghart contends that it is now almost universally agreed that the Charter obligation is bind-
ing in international law on all U.N. members, and is direct and unqualified. Id.
44. If an individual complains that his own national state has infringed the rights that
the Declaration seeks to guarantee him, his complaint is doomed to remain in the wilderness
outside the pale of international law so long as there is no international legal entity that can
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b) Universal Declaration of Human Rights.-In order to expli-
cate the U.N. Charter's comprehensive prohibition of discrimination,
in December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "as a common standard
for all peoples and all nations."'" Article 2 of the Declaration speci-
fies religion as one of the impermissible grounds of differentiation. 46
This general prohibition of discrimination is made more explicit in
Article 18, which states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship or observance."' 7 Article 1, pro-
claiming that all human beings are "endowed with reason and con-
science and should act towards one another in a spirit of brother-
hood,' 8 further asserts a belief in the ability of human beings to act
reasonably and in unison in achieving a better state for humankind.
In order to implement this aspiration, Article 26(2) urges that edu-
cation be directed to "promote understanding, tolerance and friend-
"148ship among all nations, racial or religious groups ....
c) International Covenants on Human Rights.-During the
more than three decades since the adoption of the Universal Decla-
ration, the Commission on Human Rights has sought to clarify and
delineate the elements of the right to religious freedom, and to incor-
porate these elements in an international declaration or legally bind-
ing convention. 51 In December 1966, the General Assembly unani-
mously adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
espouse it and so bring it into internal existence. H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY
LAW AND CODIFICATION 187 (1972).
45. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 20, at preamble, para. 8; see also U.N. YEAR-
BOOK 1948-49, 530-33 (1975). The Declaration represented the first of three stages of a pro-
gram designed to achieve an International Bill of Rights, based upon universally binding obli-
gations of states, and reinforced by effective curial and administrative machinery. The three
stages were to be: (I) a declaration defining the various human rights that ought to be
respected; (2) a series of binding covenants on the part of states to respect such rights as
defined; and (3) measures and machinery for implementation. J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (1984).
46. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 20, at art. 2, para. I.
47. Id. at art. 18.
48. Id. at art. 1.
49. Id. at art. 26, para. 2. The judicial status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights remains a matter of some controversy. Some commentators maintain that, however
great its moral or political authority, it cannot by itself create binding obligations under inter-
national law. Others, however, argue that it has acquired the status of ius cogens in interna-
tional law, by reason of the consistent practice of states as well as of international institutions
in invoking its provisions as evidence of the content of international law. See generally P.
SIEGHART, supra note 43, at 53-55. Sieghart concludes that the Declaration now constitutes a
binding obligation for members states of the U.N. and that the Declaration has now become
part of customary international law. Id.
50. P. SIEGHART, supra note 43, at 25.
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Rights"' and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights;5 they represent, in effect, the achievement of the
"international bill of rights" contemplated by the Assembly when it
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.5"
In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reli-
gion is included in both the general provisions against discrimination
in the enjoyment of all human rights under Article 2(1), 54 and in the
equal protection clause under Article 26.55 The prohibition of dis-
crimination is regarded to be of such overriding importance that
states are forbidden to practice discrimination on the ground of reli-
gion where derogations from their obligations would otherwise be
justified by "public emergency" under Article 4(1). 56 In Article
18(1), the basic content of the right so emphatically protected is de-
fined by prescribing complete freedom of choice regarding rectitude:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or
to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or pri-
vate, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.5
Article 18(2) further insulates this right by providing protection
against coercion that would "impair" an individual's "freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice." 58 Article 18(3)
then expresses the recognition that religious freedom, like other
rights, "may be subject to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, health, or morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others." 59 In addition, Article
24(1) provides that the special protection accorded to children is to
be effected without discrimination on account of religion,"0 and Arti-
51. CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT, supra note 20.
52. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COVENANT, supra note 20.
53. See supra note 45.
54. CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT, supra note 20, at art. 2, para. I.
55. Id. at art. 26.
56. Article 4 reads:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Cov-
enant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situations, pro-
vided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race,
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
Id.
57. Id. at art. 18, para. 1.
58. Id. at art. 18, para. 2.
59. Article 18(3) reads: "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." Id.
60. Article 24(1) provides: "Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to
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cle 27 specifically includes religious minorities as a protected minor-
ity group."1
Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights contains, in Article 2(2), a comprehensive guarantee
that the rights stipulated in the Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination on the ground of religion.6 2 Article 13(1) amplifies
this guarantee by proclaiming that education be directed to "enable
all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote under-
standing, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial,
ethnic or religious groups .
d) Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.-The Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimi-
nation Based on Religion or Belief was adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly on November 25, 1981, without a vote.64 It represents the
culmination of over twenty years of work by the Human Rights
Commission's Sub-Commission on the General Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities. Its drafting was part of an
effort to institutionalize the commitment of the United Nations to
human rights and to transform these principles into legal obliga-
tions.6 While the Declaration's substantive provisions are not bind-
race, color, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family,
society and the state." Id.
61. Article 27 stipulates: "In those states in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minori-
ties exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community
with the other members of the group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
own religion, or to use their own language." Id.
Under the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force March 23, 1976, individuals and
groups, after exhausting domestic remedies, are granted the right to appeal to the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights to obtain relief. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
62. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL COVENANT, supra note 20, at art. 2(2).
63. Id. at art. 13(1).
64. G.A. Res. 55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 36/55
(1982) [hereinafter DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE]; see also 1981 U.N.Y.B. at
881-82 (1985).
65. In 1962, the General Assembly requested a declaration and convention on religious
intolerance. At the same time the General Assembly also called for similar instruments on
racial discrimination. Although the latter were completed by 1965, the religious intolerance
drafts were not acceptable. (U.N. Docs. A/6347; A/7777; A/7930; A/8330; A/9322; A/9/
34; E/CN. 4/1145). In December 1972, the Assembly decided to "accord priority to the com-
pletion of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance before
resuming consideration of an international convention on this subject." G.A. Res. 3027, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 72, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). From 1974 on, the Assembly
set up a working group at each session of the Commission on Human Rights in order to speed
up the work. In 1979, the Assembly "noted with regret" that the Commission had so far
adopted only the title and preamble of a declaration. U.N. doc. A/C.3/33/SR. 67. See G.A.
Resolutions 1781 (XVII) (1962), 3027 (XXVII) (1972), 3069 (XXVIII) (1973), 3267
(XXIX) (1974), 31/138 (1976), 32/143 (1977), and 33/106 (1979). The representative of the
Holy See pointed out, in the Third Committee, that although the question had been discussed
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ing, they represent the most comprehensive and unambiguous codifi-
cation of the idea of religious liberty to date.66
The eight article Declaration proclaims that all people have
"the right of thought, conscience and religion."67 Article 1 declares
in broad and inclusive terms that this right exists "individually or in
community" and "in public or private."6 8 Like the earlier interna-
tional instruments, it secures a person's right to "manifest his reli-
gion in worship, observance, practice and teaching"6 9 subject only to
limitations prescribed by law and those that are "necessary to pro-
tect public safety, health or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others."70
Finally, the Declaration states that "no one shall be subject to
discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons or person
on grounds of religion or other beliefs.' Such discrimination is to
be "condemned as a violation of. . . [the] human rights and funda-
mental freedoms" that are set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights.7
States are to act to prevent and eliminate such discrimination "in the
recognition, exercise, and enjoyment of human rights and fundamen-
for a third of the century and a consensus regarding the necessity for a convention existed,
almost no progress had been achieved, and "it was evident that certain forces were trying to
prevent the declaration from becoming reality." CARDINAL CHELLI, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/33/
SR.60, para. 115 (1979). The draft declaration was finally completed and recommended for
adoption in March of 1981. COMM. ON HUM. RTS. 20 (XXXVIl), 10 Mar. 1981. By resolution,
the General Assembly requested that the Secretary General disseminate widely, as a matter of
priority and in as many languages as possible, the text of the Declaration. G.A. 37/187 (18
Dec. 1982).
. 66. The Declaration serves as a valuable guide for the interpretation of existing interna-
tional instruments, as it contains provisions that give more detailed content to the right to
freedom of religion or belief in these instruments. The international instruments relating
thereto should therefore be read as a body.
67. DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, supra note 64, at art. 1, para. 1. Arti-
cle I declares:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in pub-
lic or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,




71. Id. at art. 2, para. 1. Article 2, para. 2, operationally defines the expression "intoler-
ance and discrimination based on religion belief" to mean "any distinction, exclusion, restric-
tion or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purposes or as its effect nullifi-
cation or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis." DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, supra
note 64, at art. 2, para. 2.
72. Id. at art. 3.
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tal freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cul-
tural life' 73 by enacting or rescinding legislation where necessary. 4
Article 5 deals extensively with the religious instruction of children,
and grants the parents or legal guardians of children the exclusive
right to "organize the life within the family in accordance with their
religion or belief."75
Article 6 carefully spells out the specific freedoms encompassed
in the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
They include the freedom to worship and establish places of worship;
the freedom to establish charitable institutions; the freedom to ac-
quire necessary articles and materials to perform religious rites and
customs; the freedom to issue and disseminate relevant publications,
to teach religion in "suitable places," to solicit and receive voluntary
contributions, and to train and designate leadership; the freedom to
observe days of rest and celebrate holidays, and the freedom to es-
tablish and maintain communications with individuals and communi-
ties at both the national and international levels.7 These rights and
freedoms are to be adopted by the signatory nations through their
own domestic legislation.77 Further, the Declaration is not to be un-
derstood as a restriction or derogation of any right defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Cove-
nants on Human Rights. 8 This Declaration, along with its predeces-
73. Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
74. Id. at art. 4, para. 2.
75. Id. at art. 5.
76. Id. at art. 6. Article 6 specifically provides:
In accordance with article I of the present Declaration, and subject to the
provisions of article 1, paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the following freedoms:
a. To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and
to establish and maintain places for these purposes;
b. To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian
institutions;
c. To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary
articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or
belief;
d. To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these
areas;
e. To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
f. To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions
from individuals and institutions;
g. To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate
leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or
belief;
h. To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies
in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief;
i. To establish and maintain communications with individuals and
communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and interna-
tional levels.
77. Id. at art. 7.
78. Id. at art. 8.
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sors, and regionally-adopted treaties,7 9 establishes conclusively that
religious liberty is regarded as a fundamental human right, which
must be guaranteed to all people and protected by all states.
III. The Practice of States: A Comparative Analysis
Why should the nations say, "Where is their God?" Let the
avenging of the outpoured blood of thy servants be known
among the nations before our eyes!80
Where human rights are concerned, commentators frequently
note that a wide gap may exist between a state's verbal assertions
that it upholds the human rights of its nationals and its actual be-
havior."1 While the principle of religious liberty has recently become
recognized in international law as a basic human right that no sover-
eign state has the authority to abridge, it is necessary to inquire
whether states have given anything more than mere "lip service" to
this right in order to establish its present status. To assess the mod-
ern practices of states, the countries of the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Republic of India, and the Soviet Union will be ex-
amined. A review of the status of religious freedom evidenced in
these states is enlightening for several reasons: the important role
they play politically in today's world; the presence of many different
and diverse religious groups in each nation; the differing methods of
repression, if any, each nation utilizes; and, the emulation of their
civil rights and liberties policies by other states.
In a theoretical framework, freedom of religion implies freedom
79. On the regional level, the principle of religious freedom is embodied both in general
proscriptions banning discrimination that include religion as a prohibited ground of differentia-
tion, and in particular prescriptions that give substance to the freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. Thus, the European Convention on Human Rights includes religion in Article 14
as among the impermissible grounds of differentiation, and spells out the content of the free-
dom of religion in Article 9. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Sept. 3, 1953,
213 U.N.T.S. 222. Similarly, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
proclaims, in Article 2, that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and have the rights and
duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or
any other factor." O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ SeT. L/V/II. 23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948). Article
1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights expressly forbids discrimination on ac-
count of religion, and this principle is reinforced by the equal protection clause of Article 24;
furthermore, Article 27(1) provides that a state may not take measures that involve religious
discrimination, even during an emergency. The provision on the freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion is found in Article 12. O.A.S.T. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.
L./V/ll. 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1969). See also ARTICLE V AND BASKET Ill OF HELSINKI AC-
CORDS, signed August 1, 1975, 37 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 323 (1975); AFRICAN CHARTER ON
HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Dec. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5,
21 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 58 (1982).
80. Psalm 79:10.
81. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 13A, at 19-20 (1955);
Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order?, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV.
269, 282-83 (1978); Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of
Human Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L. REV. 626 (1984).
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to act as well as freedom not to act, according to a wide spectrum of
conviction. The data provided by judicial systems characterizes the
limits of religious freedom by determining which activities may
rightly be called religious. Court cases involving religious freedom
are precipitated by some form of coercion, whether in the form of
preventing certain activities or in the form of forcing behaviors on
the unwilling. The public health, order, morals, or education of soci-
ety, however, may set aside the guarantees of religious liberty. These
tenets provide the structure for this analysis.
A. Case Study: United States
The political system of the United States is extremely tolerant
of religion,82 respecting the command of the first amendment of its
constitution that it shall not abridge the free exercise of religion.
83
No individual can be denied a government job simply because he
belongs to a particular faith or does not believe in God at all.84 Arti-
82. According to THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK 1986-87 (1986), as of 1982, the num-
ber of churches and religious believers were:
Local Total
Denominations Churches Mem--rship
Protestant bodies 310,284 76,754,009
Roman Catholic Church 24,071 52,088,774
Jews 3,500 5,725,000
Eastern Churches 1,632 3,859,668
Old Catholic, Polish/Armenia 427 924,861
Buddhists 62 100,000
Miscellaneous 1,135 150,747
1982 totals 341,111 139,603,059
The United States voted in favor of the Universal Declaration and the Declaration on the
Elimination of Religious Intolerance. The United States Senate, however, has not ratified ei-
ther of the Human Rights Conventions. See generally Y. KLY, THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS FOR-
EIGN POLICY, THE BLACK MINORITY IN THE U.S., AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 213-280 (1979);
R. VINCENT, FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 165-188 (1986); R. LILLICH, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (1983).
83. The first amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The constitutions of many states also
explicitly provide for freedom of religion. For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides
the following:
Section 3. All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Al-
mighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of
right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to main-
tain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case
whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preferences
shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
Section 4. No person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future
state of rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious sentiments,
be disqualified to hold any office or place of trust or profit under this
Commonwealth.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 3 and § 4.
84. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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cle VI, section 3 of the Constitution states that ". . . no religious
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to an Office or public
Trust under the United States."8 5 In addition, the laws of many
states make it illegal for employers, 86 trade unions,87 landlords, 8 or
real estate brokers89 to discriminate against anyone on account of his
religion.
The United States Supreme Court has been an avid defender of
the first amendment's free exercise clause. The extent to which it is
prepared to protect religious belief can be seen in a number of its
decisions. Many of these decisions have been compelled by the com-
plaints of minority religious groups. One such group is the Jehovahs'
Witnesses. In the case of Cantwell v. Connecticut,9" for example, a
Jehovah's Witness appealed his conviction by a Connecticut court
for various crimes, including breach of the peace. Cantwell had
walked through a Catholic neighborhood in New Haven, Connecti-
cut and asked passers-by if he could play his records for them. When
somebody would agree to hear him, he started a phonograph. The
records contained violent attacks on the Roman Catholic Church;
one Catholic listener testified that he felt like hitting Cantwell, while
another pedestrian told Cantwell to get off the street before some-
thing happened to him.9' The Supreme Court held that convicting
Cantwell for violating a state statute that prohibited the solicitation
of money for religious purposes unless approved by a state official
violated his right to freely practice his religion. The Court noted that
the freedom of religion protects not only mild pleading on behalf of
one's views, but even some exaggeration, falsehood and vilification of
one's opponents.9"
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette," the
Court also held that a state could not compel Jehovah's Witnesses to
salute the flag in school when to do so would be in violation of their
religious beliefs. Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard,9 the Court
stated that Jehovah's Witnesses living in New Hampshire may tape
over that part of their license plates that proclaims "Live Free or
Die," for forcing them to display this slogan unconstitutionally in-
85. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
86. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1412 (Deering 1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (Con-
sol. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon 1964).
87. See, e.g., CAL. TRADE UNIONS CODE § 1411 (Deering 1984).
88. See. e.g., CAL. HOUSING CODE § 35700 (Deering 1984); N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW §
223 (COnsol. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h)(4) (Purdon 1964).
89. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10177 (Deering 1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(Consol. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 959 (Purdon 1964).
90. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
91. Id. at 303, 309.
92. Id. at 310.
93. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
94. 430 U.S. 707 (1977).
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fringed upon the rules of their creed.95
The most delicate problems in the United States involving free-
dom. of religion, however, have arisen when an act commanded by
one's faith violates state or federal legislation intended to promote
health, safety, morality, or education, and not when state action
tends to stamp out religious dissent.96 An outstanding example of
this is presented by anti-polygamy laws. The Morman religion per-
mits its male adherents to have more than one spouse. In Utah, the
federal government, in Reynolds v. United States,97 prosecuted a
Morman for being polygamous.98 As a defense to his prosecution,
Reynolds claimed that his conduct was protected by the free exercise
clause of the first amendment.99 Relying heavily on the writings of
Thomas Jefferson, the Court concluded that the free exercise clause
protects only religious beliefs and not actions motivated by those
beliefs.100 In the Court's view, if religiously motivated actions were
protected, every man could become a law unto himself. l01
Although the government has often been the victor in court bat-
tles addressing the conflict between unorthodox religious practices
and the state's power to promote the health, safety, education, and
morality of its citizens, it has also encountered defeat on a number
of occasions.102 Because without some compelling state interest,
there can be no legitimate governmental intrusion into religious af-
fairs'0 3 either for purposes of investigation or regulation, the govern-
ment has often had its hands tied when combatting unattractive reli-
gious practices.
As a general rule, the truth or falsity of religious beliefs or doc-
95. Id.
96. For a recent controversial issue involving the state interest in the health of its citi-
zens, see Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985); Walker v.
Superior Court, 176 Cal. 3d 526 (1984) (parents found guilty of involuntary manslaughter of
child for withholding necessary medical treatment because of religious objection). For a cur-
rent conflict involving the free exercise of religion and education, see Silence, A Denial of
Religious Freedom, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 13, 1986, at 6 (parents suing school board to compel it to
provide alternative reading textbooks that do not offend their fundamental Christian religious
beliefs); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1980) (denied tax benefits
to religious educational institution because of racial discriminatory practice).
97. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
98. Reynolds was charged with bigamy, in violation of Sect. 5352 of the Revised Stat-
ues, which, omitting its exceptions, is as follows:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether
married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States
have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of
not more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term of not more than five
years.
98 U.S. at 146.
99. Id. at 161-62.
100. Id. at 163-64.
101. Id. at 166-67.
102. See, e.g., infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
103. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. at 603.
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trines lies beyond the competence of civil authorities.1 'o One well-
publicized example involves the Amish, a group who believes among
other things, that education beyond the eighth grade level is danger-
ous because it would expose their youth to worldly influences. In the
case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 06 Wisconsin claimed that its interest in
compulsory education for all children within the state was compel-
ling enough to override any impingement on Amish parents' free ex-
ercise of religion.106 The Court recognized that "[piroviding public
schools rank[ed] at the very apex of the function of the state."' '
The Court noted that this strong interest in universal education,
however, was not "totally free from a balancing process when it im-
pinge[d] on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifi-
cally protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
"108
Upon weighing the interests of the Amish with those of the
state, the Court found that "enforcement of the State's requirement
of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely
endanger if not destroy the free exercise of . . . [the Amish] be-
liefs." 109 Since the Amish had met the burden of demonstrating the
adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational
education, the Court held the compulsory school attendance law had
been unconstitutionally applied to the Amish.'
104. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated in United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1944), that the first amendment prohibits the courts from examining the truth of
religious representations:
The (first) amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief...
embraces the right to maintain theories of life and death and of the hereafter
which are ranked heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths . . . . Men may
believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their reli-
gious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some
may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the
ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law.
Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be sup-
posed that they could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determin-
ing whether these teachings contained false representation. The miracles of the
New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are
deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could be sent to jail because a
jury in a hostile environment found these teachings false, little indeed would be
left of religious freedoms . . . . The religious views espoused by [the Ballards]
might seem incredible, if not preposterous to most people. But if those doctrines
are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then
the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect . . . . When the
triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.
Id. at 86-87 (citations omitted).
105. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
106. Id. at 213-15.
107. Id. at 213.
108. Id. at 214.
109. Id. at 219.
110. Id. at 235, 236.
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It appears, however, that since 1982 the United States Supreme
Court has halted further expansion of the protection afforded by the
free exercise clause, and may even have cut back the scope of that
protection in its decision in United States v. Lee."' In Lee, an Amish
employer failed to pay social security taxes because he believed that
such payment and receipt of benefits would violate the Amish
faith. 1 2 Although Congress had provided Amish employees with an
exemption from paying social security taxes, the Court held that
neither the exemption nor the free exercise clause would exempt the
Amish employer from paying the tax. The Court concluded that the
soundness of the social security system was of such an overriding
governmental interest as to justify the limitation on religious
liberty." 3
Justice Stevens noted in a concurring opinion:
The Court's attempt to distinguish Yoder is unconvincing
because precisely the same religious interest is implicated in
both cases, and Wisconsin's interest in requiring its children to
attend school until they reach the age of 16 is surely not inferior
to the federal interest in collecting these social security taxes." 4
Thus, it appears that Lee has called a halt to the movement ex-
panding the protection afforded by the free exercise clause of the
first amendment. With the promotion of William Rehnquist to Chief
Justice and the recent appointments of conservatives Antonin Scalia
and Anthony Kennedy to the Supreme Court, it is likely that the
state will gain greater power to limit religion where state interests
are involved. 1 5 It still appears to be true, however, that "[t]he es-
sence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only
those interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion" ' 6 in the United States.
B. Case Study: United Kingdom
Like that of the United States, the British government is gener-
ally very tolerant of minority religious groups."" Although it was not
until 1858 that Jews who refused to swear that they were Christian
Ill. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
112. Id. at 257.
113. Id. at 256-61.
114. Id. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. See Maddox, Church and State: The Ramparts Besieged, CHRISTIAN CENTURY
191-92 (Feb. 25, 1987).
116. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215.
117. According to THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK 1986-87, at 1330 (1986), as of June
1984, there were 40,448 churches and chapels open in the United Kingdom. Of them, the
membership is as follows:
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could sit in Parliament 1 8 and not until 1871 that they could attend
Oxford and Cambridge Universities,' 19 it was as early as 1883 that
Chief Justice Coleridge said that Christianity was no longer auto-
matically the law of Britain, and that one could thus criticize the
Christian faith without being guilty of blasphemy.120 The Oaths Act
of 1888 allowed atheists to take their seats in Parliament and when
witnesses in court to affirm rather than swear unto God.12 1 The
House of Lords, in 1917, made it clear in Bowman v. Secular Soci-
ety122 that a bequest to a society that "promote[s] . . . the principle
that human conduct should be based upon natural knowledge, and
not upon supernatural belief, and that human welfare in this world is
the proper end of all thought and action" is valid.l1
3
In 1966, the Home Office, which controls the London police,
stated that it doubted that the offense of blasphemy would ever be
prosecuted in modern times. In 1978, however, in the case of R. v.
Lemon 24 the editor and publisher of a newspaper were convicted of













In 1985, there were about 333,000 Jews in the U.K. with about 295 synagogues. Of the
countries examined in this Comment, the United Kingdom is the only nation that has its own
state church, the Church of England. The established Church of England is Protestant Episco-
pal and is the faith of the majority of Britains. The Queens is, under God, the Supreme Gover-
nor of the Church of England, with the right, regulated by statute, to nominate the archbish-
ops. Id. at 1329.
Unlike most states, the United Kingdom does not have a single document, such as the
Constitution of the United States, which defines the system of government, outlines the func-
tions to be performed by the institutions of government, and states the rights and obligations of
citizens. The United Kingdom has an "unwritten" constitution in the sense that some major
forms of political behavior are not enshrined in acts of Parliament or are not binding in a legal
manner. In addition, there are no basic laws or codes that can be altered only by a special
amendment procedure. All laws in the U.K., no matter how important they are from a consti-
tutional point of view, can be changed in the same way, that is by a simple majority in British
Parliament. The Parliament has ratified the human rights covenants. R. LILLICH, supra note
82.
118. M. CURTIS, 17 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD - UNITED
KINGDOM 14 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1983).
119. Id. at 15.
120. R. V. Ramsay v. Foote, 15 Cox. Crim. Cas. 231, 238 (1883).
121. OATHS ACT, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 46 (1888).
122. [1917] A.C. 406.
123. Id.
124. [1978] 3 All E.R. 175 (C.A.); [1979] I All E.R. 898 (H.L.).
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illustrating its subject matter that purported to describe in explicit
detail acts of sodomy and fellatio with the body of Christ immedi-
ately after his death and that ascribed to him promiscuous homosex-
ual practices during his lifetime. The Court of Appeal upheld the
conviction and the House of Lords approved the decision. " '
Similar to the practice in the United States, when there has
been a conflict in Great Britain between and individual or group's
free exercise of religion and the public health, order or morals, the
former has given way. For instance, if a person prosecuted for crimi-
nally neglecting someone in his care by refusing to give him neces-
sary medicine, the person refusing treatment cannot raise as a de-
fense that he objected to the use of the medicine on religious
grounds. In R. v. Senior,12 a father was convicted under the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Children Act of 1894 for failing to provide medi-
cal aid and medicine to his child, even though he knew him to be
dangerously ill. The defendant was in all other respects a loving par-
ent, but refused to obtain medical assistance because he was a mem-
ber of a religious sect that objected to physicians and drugs.'
Britain has also been troubled by the question of whether some-
thing is "religious.' 28 In the case of Henning v. Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints,2 9 the question was whether the Mor-
mon temple in Godstone, Surrey, was entitled to a property tax ex-
emption as a place of public worship. There was no doubt that Mor-
mon chapels were places of religious worship; but the temple, unlike
the Mormon chapels, was not open to the public, nor even to all
Mormons. People entering the temple had to possess certain requisite
spiritual qualities. The court held that the temple was not entitled to
the tax exemption since it was really a private sanctuary for sacred
rites rather than a place of public worship.'" In a more recent ex-
ample, the Ethical Cultural Society was denied a property tax ex-
emption for one of its halls, since the group does not believe in a
Supreme Being. 13 1
125. Id. See also Ahmad v. Inner London Education Authority, [1978] 1 All E.R. 574
(C.A.) (court refused to construe statute to allow a Moslem teacher, without losing pay, to
miss class to pray on Friday at a mosque).
126. [1899] 1 QB. 283.
127. Id. at 283-84.
128. This definitional problem frequently occurs whenever a statute grants or takes
away benefits from a "religious" group. The best known situation in the United States involves
conscientious objection to war. The relevant statute exempted from the draft only religious
conscientious objectors. However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an example of tolerance, ex-
tended the exemption to clearly felt conscientious objection to war on secular grounds. Welsh
v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
129. [1962] 3 All E.R. 364.
130. Id. at 367.
131. See THE TIMES (London), Feb. 20, 1980, p. 14; compare Washington Ethical Soc'y
v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (U.S. court declared Ethical Culture
property exempt from tax, holding that belief in or teaching of a Supreme Being or supernatu-
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Until recently, the most profound exception to the policy of offi-
cial religious tolerance in the United Kingdom could be found in
Northern Ireland. With respect to local affairs, this region was until
1972 largely governed by its own Parliament. In response to the vio-
lence between Catholics and Protestants, 132 Britain took over direct
responsibility for the administration of Northern Ireland. The
"Stormont" legislature, which had sought to maintain the "Protes-
tant ascendancy" in Ulster, subjected Catholics to certain subtle dis-
abilities, although they worshipped openly and without hindrance.13
There was a property qualification for voting in elections to local
council in Northern Ireland: to vote one had to be an owner or a
renter or a spouse of an owner or renter. This effectively disqualified
many Catholics from participating in and influencing affairs of state.
On the whole, Catholic families in Northern Ireland are larger than
Protestant families because of the objection of Catholics to the use
of birth control. Because of the growth of the Catholic population,
without a concurrent increase in wealth, many Catholics have been
disenfranchised by the property requirements. For this reason, the
town of Derry, as an example, which is two to one Catholic, had in
1969 thirteen thousand Protestant voters to only nine thousand
Catholic voters."3 The Protestants also maintained their dominance
over local government by use of gerrymandering, throwing most
Catholic voters into a few election districts. In addition, the local
authorities often favored Protestants over Catholics when it came to
allocating municipal jobs and apartments in public housing."3 '
These government measures helped to breed the distrust and
bloodshed that plagues Belfast and other Ulster communities. Al-
though a number of proposals have been proffered in the last decade
to set up a new political structure in Northern Ireland, little progress
has been made. In the meantime, what began ostensibly as a civil
rights campaign in 1968 by an illegal organization, the Irish Repub-
lican Army, has escalated into a full-scale offensive designed to over-
throw British rule. At times, counter-measures have required the ser-
vices of over twenty-thousand regular troops. As of 1981, over 2,000
persons had been killed as a result of the sectarian violence.1 36 The
ral power is not essential to qualify for tax exemption accorded to "religious corporations,"
"churches," or "religious societies," under the D.C. code).
132. Northern Ireland is two-thirds Protestant, and one-third Roman Catholic. THE
WORLD ALMANAC-t987, at 626 (M. Hoffman ed. 1986).
133. R. VINCENT, supra note 82, at 121.
134. The Derry City Council consisted of 12 Unionists (formerly the major political arm
of Ulster Protestantism) and only 8 Nationalists (the then major party of the Northern Irish
Catholics). David Holden, A Bad Case of the Troubles Called Londonderry, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. 10 (Aug. 3, 1969).
135. R. VINCENT, supra note 82, at 125. See generally L. DE PAOR, DIVIDED ULSTER
(1970); J. DARBY, CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1976).
136. THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK, supra note 82, at 1349.
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legal discrimination is gone; but, on the unofficial level, Protestants
and Catholics continue to battle to the death.
The situation of Northern Ireland poignantly demonstrates the
difficulty in diffusing the historical intolerance of two religious
groups in a country that has a predominant state religion - Protes-
tant. 137 While the modern British government has come to respect
and protect the adherents of all religions, the prejudices and fears of
minority religion participants has not been easily overcome through
state assurances.
C. Case Study: India
In contrast to the United States and Great Britain, India explic-
itly declares in its constitution that it is a secular state. The Indian
Constitution deals with the right to freedom of religion extensively in
Article 25 through Article 39.138 or religious denomination.
137. See supra note 117. In November, 1985, the governments of the United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland entered into a formal agreement whereby an Intergovernmental
Conference was established to give the Republic of Ireland a voice in the governing of North-
ern Ireland; the accord was strongly opposed by Ulster Loyalists. Resistance continues on both
sides. THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK, supra note 82, at 1349.
138. The provisions on the right to freedom of religion read:
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of
religion.-(I) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other pro-
visions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and
the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall effect the operation of any existing law or
prevent the State from making any law -
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or
other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of
Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sec-
tions of Hindus.
26. Freedom to manage religious affairs.-Subject to public order, morality
and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the
right -
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable
purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
27. Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular reli-
gion.-No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are
specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or mainte-
nance of any particular religion or religious denomination.
28. Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in
certain educational institutions.-( I) No religious instruction shall be provided
in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds.
(2) Nothing in clause (I) shall apply to an educational institution which is
administered by the State but has been established under any endowment or
trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such
institution.
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by the State
or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious
instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious
worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached
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It provides that, so long as religions function within their respective
legitimate spheres, the Constitution will be religiously neutral in re-
gard to them.
1 3
India is in reality, however, much less secularized then either
the United States or United Kingdom, with religion playing an im-
portant role in the lives of a majority of Indian citizens.1"" Because
of this, India lives under the constant threat of civil war between
rival religious groups."' Aware of this fact, the Indian government is
generally tolerant towards claims of freedom of religion, but there
are noteworthy exceptions to this general orientation.
thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given
his consent thereto.
The provisions pertaining to the cultural and educational rights of Indian citizens provide:
29. Protection of interests of minorities.- (I) Any section of the citizens re-
siding in the territory of India or any part thereof have a distinct language,
script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution
maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institu-
tions.-(l) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
[(I-A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any
property of an educational institution established and administered by a minor-
ity, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or
determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would
not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause.]
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discrimi-
nate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the man-
agement of a minority whether based on religion or language.
INDIA CONST. arts. 25-30.
139. But see infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text for an example of the govern-
ment's willingness to resort to violence when one religion's adherents seek to gain political
supremacy.
140. See supra note 138. The drafters of the Constitution believed that in a multi-reli-
gious community, secularism was consistent with a true democratic spirit. Indian secularism is
not anti-God or anti-religion. It recognizes the fact that religion serves a very important pur-
pose in human life. But it subscribes to the fundamental Hindu philosophical tenet that all
religions have elements of truth and no religion can claim a monopoly of truth. M. PYLEE,
INDIA'S CONSTITUTION 121 (1967); P. GAJENDRAGADKAR, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: ITS
PHILOSOPHY AND BASIC POSTULATES 40-41 (1969).
India, like the United Kingdom, has voted in favor of the Declarations discussed and has









THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK, supra note 82, at 635.
141. There has been a historical conflict between Hindus and Moslems. See generally
M. PYLEE, supra note 140; ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 1978, at 70; N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1980, at
A3, Notes on Church and State Affairs, 25 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 381 (1983); and also
infra notes 172-78 and accompanying notes.
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Article 25 of the Constitution provides for freedom of con-
science and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.
Similar to the practice in both the United States and Great Britain,
this freedom may be restricted when confronted with concerns over
public order, morality and health.142 Express provision is made in
Article 25 for these limitations. In addition to this limitation, the
freedom of religion provided in Article 25 does not affect the opera-
tion of any existing law or prevent from making any law - (a) regu-
lating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular
activity which may be associated with religious practice; and (b)
providing for social welfare and reform; or (c) throwing open Hindu
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections
of Hindu.
1 43
Article 26 guarantees to every religious denomination, and to
every sect, branch, or splinter group, the freedom to manage its own
religious affairs. This freedom includes the right (a) to establish and
maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to
manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire
movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such prop-
erty in accordance with the law. " This freedom again is subject to
limitation when public order, morality and health require but, unlike
the freedom guaranteed by Article 25, is not subject to the other
provisions. 14 5 The rights embodied in Articles 25 and 26 must be
read along side Articles 14, 15 and 16, which prohibit discrimination
on the ground of religion, thus providing an additional safeguard for
religious freedom. 46
142. INDIA CONST. art. 25, para. 1.
143. Id. at art. 25, paras. 2(a) and (b).
144. Id. at art. 26, para. (a) through (d).
145. Id.
.146. These articles respectively provide:
14. Equality before law.-The State shall not deny to any person equality
before law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
INDIA CONST. art. 14.
15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or
place of birth.-(I) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on
grounds only of religion ....
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion .... be subject to any disa-
bility, liability, restriction or condition with regard to -
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public
entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public
resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the
use of the general public . ...
INDIA CONST. art. 15.
16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.-(I) There
shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment
or appointment to any office under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion . . . be ineligible for, or
discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State
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Despite the Indian Constitution's comprehensive grant of reli-
gious freedom, there have been a number of situations in which reli-
gious groups have claimed that a particular state1 7 or the national
government, acting under its power to promote public health, wel-
fare, and order, have treated them too repressively. Relying on Arti-
cles 25 and 26, the state of Madras in 1951, passed an Act enabling
a public commissioner to superintend and administer religious en-
dowments of Hindu temples to make sure that the temples were
properly maintained.)1 8 The commissioner had the right to enter
temples and, under certain circumstances, to dismiss trustees of reli-
gious institutions and appoint others in their places - or even to
start administering the temple directly through one of his assistants.
The trustees of the temple had to submit reports to the commissioner
and receive his permission before any sale or mortgage of the im-
movable property of the temple could be permitted. Furthermore,
surplus temple funds could be spent only in accordance with the pur-
poses listed in the Act, and particular expenditures for these pur-
poses had to be approved by a deputy commissioner. 49
In Shirur Math 50 the Supreme Court of India sustained some,
and invalidated other parts of this Act. The temple priests asserted
that the Act was invalid, pointing to Article 26(b), which gives each
religious denomination the right "to manage its own affairs in mat-
ters of religion."' 5' The Court held unconstitutional those parts of
the law that gave the commissioner an unrestricted right of entry
and complete control over surplus income, required the temple heads
to appoint a manager for the secular affairs of the institution,
obliged the temple to pay up to five percent of its annual income to
compensate the state for the services the government rendered, and
granted the state the right to administer its property in accordance
with law. 152 However, it upheld those sections of the Act allowing
the commissioner to modify the budget of Hindu religious institu-
tions, and said that he could regulate temple expenditures on reli-
gious ceremonies even though it was the religious denomination that
had the right to determine what ceremonies were essential to the
faith. 5 In 1959, Madras passed a new law providing for the reten-
tion of a state's power to prevent the abuse of temple funds, but
limiting the right of entry and giving the temple priests control over
INDIA CONST. art. 16.
147. The Republic of India is composed of 24 States and 7 centrally administered Union
Territories. THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK, supra note 82, at 644.
148. See Shirur Math, [1954] A.I.R. 282 (Madras).
149. Id.
150. [1954] A.I.R. 282 (Madras).
151. Id. at 284.





In the case of Devaru v. State Mysore,1 " a sect of the Gowda
Sarawath Brahmins argued that an Act providing that untouchables
"shall be entitled to enter any Hindu temple and offer worship
therein in the same manner and to the same extent as Hindus in
general" was unconstitutional under Article 26(b), which granted
each religious denomination "the right to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion." 1" The Court noted that Article 25(2)(b), which
allows the state to throw open Hindu religious institutions of a public
character to all classes and sections of Hindus, and Article 26(b)
were in literal conflict. To resolve this conflict, the Court held the
Act valid insofar as it required the Hindu temples to admit untouch-
ables most of the year but unconstitutional as to prohibit the
Brahmins from excluding untouchables and other members of the
general public from the temples while its most sacred ceremonies
were being held. 15"
Additionally, another example of repression arises out of the
Hindu belief that the humble cow is a sacred animal. Most Indian
states have passed cow slaughter bans under the protective umbrella
of Article 48.15' In Quareshi v. Bihar,"' the Indian Supreme Court
was confronted squarely with the question of whether these bans
were an unconstitutional infringement of the rights of Moslems to
freely practice their religion by sacrificing cows on their festival of
Bakr Id. The Court, in upholding this legislation, put itself in the
position of a group of Moslem theologians. It found, first of all, that
it is the duty of every free Moslem to offer a sacrifice on Bakr Id.
However, the Court observed that the sacrificed animal does not
have to be a cow, even though Indian Moslems had been sacrificing
this particular animal from time immemorial. The Court reasoned
that the religious requirements of Bakr Id can be satisfied by the
slaughter of a goat for one person or a camel for seven persons.
While it is true that a family might not be able to sacrifice seven
goats, the Court concluded that the compulsion to sacrifice a cow is
economic, not religious. Since cow slaughter on Bakr Id was not
made obligatory by Islam, its prohibition under an otherwise valid
law was held not to have infringed the religious liberties of
Moslems. 159
Another event, which to some Indian Moslems seemed to re-
154. [19581 A.I.R. 255.
155. Id. at 267-68; see INDIA CONST. art. 26(b) supra note 138.
156. Id. at 269.
157. INDIA CONST. art. 48 reads: "The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the
environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country."
158. 21 Sup. Ct. J. 975 (1958).
159. Id.
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present serious repression of their religious liberties, involved Aligarh
Moslem University, the intellectual center of Indian Moslems, and
before Pakistan's independence, the source and intellectual center for
the movement to develop a separate Moslem state in Pakistan. In
1951, the Indian government passed a law providing that non-Mos-
lems could become members of the University "Court," the institu-
tion's governing body, and gave the president of India the authority
to appoint the vice-chancellor, the real head of the University. Hindu
extremists were interested in erasing the Moslem character of the
University but the government was motivated simply by a desire to
insure that the University would adhere to the provisions of the con-
stitution that prohibited institutions receiving state aid to require re-
ligious instruction of any student or to discriminate in admissions on
account of religion, caste or language. 160
In 1965, a riot erupted against the secularist Moslem Vice-
Chancellor of the University. The rioters were conservative Moslem
students protesting a proposal that would have had the effect of re-
ducing the percentage of Moslems in the medical and engineering
colleges. The Vice-Chancellor was injured, and the Indian Minister
of Education, himself a secularist Moslem, had the union cabinet
pass an ordinance that reduced the power of the University Court
and vested greater authority in the hands of the government-selected
Vice-Chancellor. 1 ' Thus, the effect of the 1951 and 1965 reforms
were to put Aligarh University under secular control.
The Moslems who wanted to return Aligarh Moslem University
to Moslem control brought suit in court to have the 1951 statute and
the 1965 decree declared invalid. They relied on Article 30(1) of the
Indian Constitution, which gives religious and linguistic minorities
"the right to establish and administer educational institutions of
their choice. '1 62 Their contention was that this statute and decree
deprived the Moslem minority of the right to administer its own edu-
cational institution. The Indian Supreme Court, however, upheld the
constitutionality of these laws. " It found, first, that under Article
30(1), the only educational institutions that minorities have the right
to administer are those that they have established. The predecessor
of the Aligarh Moslem University, a college created under the aus-
pices of another university, may have been set up by Moslems, but
the establishment of Aligarh University took place when it was
raised from college to university status, the result, the Court con-
160. See Wright, Muslim Education in India at the Crossroads: The Case of Aligarh,
39 PAC. AFF. 50 (1966).
161. Id.
162. Azeez Basha v. Union of India, [1968] A.I.R. (S. Ct.) 662.
163. Id. at 672-73.
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tended, of an act of the Indian government in 1920, although admit-
tedly passed at the request of India's Moslems. Therefore, Aligarh
Moslem University, the Court concluded, was established by the
government of India and not the Moslem community; the Moslem
community thus had no constitutional right to continue to administer
it. 164
To obtain political support, Prime Minister Desai, in 1978, de-
cided to let the University revert to Moslem control. Nonetheless,
Hindu-Moslem tension still exists, making Moslems feel like second
class citizens, due in large part to such factors as the cow slaughter
legislation, the severe unemployment among educated Moslems, and
the significant under-representation of Moslems in government
service.?65
Although Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution grants all
persons the right to propagate as well as practice religion, Christian-
ity, which is a proselytizing faith unlike Hinduism, has been re-
stricted from growing in India.' 6 During the years of British rule in
India, Christianity became the religion of a significant number of
Indians, due to the efforts of European missionaries. As a result, to-
day Christian missionaries are viewed as agents of western imperial-
ism, and so are suspect in certain Hindu and radical quarters.'" 7 In
1955, there were over 5,700 foreign missionaries in the country, but
by 1972 there were only 3,000.168 Several states have passed "anti-
conversion" bills aimed mainly at Christian missionaries.1 69 Various
Christian evangelists have been arrested under these laws, which
have been sustained by the Indian Supreme Court on the theory that
the right to propagate one's religion implies the right to give an ex-
position of its tenets but not the right to convert. ° Moreover, Hindu
fanatics have beaten Christian missionaries; local governments have
jailed converted Christians and have further refused to allow Chris-
tians to build churches.""
The most recent sectarian conflict is occurring in the state of
Punjab, considered the homeland of most of India's thirteen million
Sikhs. ' The Sikhs have sought greater political autonomy for the
164. Id. at 670.
165. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1973, at 2; 97 NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 26, 1979, at 110; N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1980, at A5; Notes on Church-State Affairs, 25 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE
381 (1983).
166. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
167. M. BATES, supra note 15, at 271; Lesser, The Evangelization Crisis in India, 211
THE CATH. WORLD 166, 168 (1970); THE TABLET (London 233:144, Feb. 10, 1979).
168. LIBERTY, July-Aug., 1972, at 23.
169. See LIBERTY, Nov.-Dec., 1970, at 18.
170. See, e.g., Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., [19771 1 S. Ct. Cas. 677.
171. Lesser, supra note 167, at 166-171; THE STATESMAN, May 21, 1979, at I.
172. "Sikhism" is a Hindu religious sect founded in Northern India about 1500 B.C.
and is based on the belief in one God, and on the rejection of the caste system and of idolatry.
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Punjab state and greater security for Sikhs as a religious minority in
predominantly Hindu India.173 In the summer of 1984, Sikh mili-
tants defied the Indian government and seized control of the Golden
Temple at Amritsar, the Sikh's holiest temple. The Indian Army
sealed off the temple and three days later drove the Sikh militants
out. Upwards of a thousand people were killed and 1450 were ar-
rested. 17 4 Four months later, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was as-
sassinated by Sikh extremists who claimed their act was in revenge
for the attack in the Golden Temple. Widespread rioting followed,
causing over 1,000 deaths.1" Over 4,500 citizens were preventively
detained under the state's National Security Act.176 Among those
were Sikh priests and religious preachers, detained for making "ob-
jectionable" or "inflamatory speeches." 77 Finally, in 1986, the Sikhs
declared the independence of Punjab as the nation of Khalistan.' 7"
Although India continues to be beset by sectarian strife, the
government has chosen not to remedy the conflicts by prohibiting the
religious practices of one or more religious groups. Instead, India has
sought to unite its religiously heterogenous population by sedulously
accommodating them. In this way, the government hopes that its
people will be bound together by the feeling that, whatever their reli-
gions may be, Indian people belong to one brotherhood of Indian
citizens. However, this policy of tolerance is tempered with the un-
derstanding that government action will be swift and severe if a reli-
gious group attempts to use violence to achieve supremacy.
D. Case Study: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
There is probably no place in the world where the struggle be-
tween church and state is played out so persistently, with such strong
ideological viewpoints, and through such elaborate mechanisms, as it
is in the Soviet Union. In the U.S.S.R. there is a widely institution-
alized and elaborate system of "atheization" of the population that
has now matured through a seventy-year history. Because it is an
extreme case of secularization, the poignancy and clarity of the con-
flict make evident many dimensions only dimly perceived in the
countries already discussed. 79
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1325 (2d ed. 1984).
173. Notes on Church-States Affairs, 25 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 582 (1984).
174. Notes on Church-States Affairs, 26 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 564 (1984).
175. THE WORLD ALMANAC - 1987, supra note 126, at 579.
176. AMNESTY INT'L REP. 1986, supra at 221 (1986).
177. Id.
178. S. JAIN, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD I I (A. Blaustein and
H. Hecker eds. 1986).
179. The Soviet Union has ratified each of the international human rights covenants. R.
LILLICH, supra note 82. It supported the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief on the understanding
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The number of religious groups in the U.S.S.R. is large and di-
verse. These include: Russian Orthodox, Moslem, Georgian Ortho-
dox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Protestant, and Jew-
ish. 8 ' Article 52 of the Soviet Constitution expressly grants citizens
the rights "to profess or not to profess any religion and to conduct
religious worship or atheistic propaganda," but excludes the right to
conduct "religious propaganda" or what believers regard as preach-
ing and teaching religious beliefs.1 81 The proliferation of religion is
viewed as counter-productive to the success of communism as it
poses a threat to the state's goal of securing the total allegiance of its
subjects."8 2
Despite the Soviet Union's attempt to eradicate religious devo-
tion, religious groups still exist, both openly and through under-
ground networks. A plurality of the believers adhere to the tenets of
the Russian Orthodox Church.'83 The fate of Russian Orthodoxy
under Russian communism has been a checkered one and its future
remains difficult to predict. Former Premier Nikita Khrushchev
closed two-thirds of the 20,000 churches opened after World War II,
and the decline has continued ever since. 8 4 In 1974, figures leaked
by the government's Council on Religious Affairs suggested that
7,500 churches were open, 1000 of them were not in use.' 85 Cur-
rently, six monasteries and ten convents survive, down from 69 in
1985, and several hundred before 1917.186
The Russian Orthodox Church was disestablished by the Bol-
sheviks in 1918, soon after they had come to power. The churches
were required to forfeit their right to own buildings. Lenin mandated
that: protection for freedom of religion and belief included freedom not to profess any religion,
to have atheistic beliefs and to propagandize them without restrictions; no one should be sub-
ject to discrimination on religious grounds or for holding atheistic beliefs; freedom of con-
science presupposed the inadmissibility of using religion to the prejudice of the State, society
or its citizens; education was secular in many countries and schools were separate from the
church; and no provision of the Declaration could permit interference in the internal affairs of
States. 1981 U.N.Y.B. 880.
180. The Soviet Union made no reference to religion in its census, so it is not known
with any degree of certainty how many adherents its religious groups and sects have. The
government tends to play down the number of believers in God in the U.S.S.R., while foreign
observers sympathetic to religion imply that this number is substantial.
181. U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 52 reads:
Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the
right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or
atheistic propaganda. Incitement of hostilities or hatred on religious grounds is
forbidden.
In the U.S.S.R. the church is separated from the state, and the school from
the church.
182. THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITs LAws, 209 (L. Hecht ed. 1983).
183. Lucey, The Soviet Union: Religious Institutions and Practices, 5 0.16-7 (No. 3,
1984); LIBERTY, Nov.-Dec., 1986, at 19 (estimates that there are between 30 and 50 million
Orthodox believers in the U.S.S.R.).
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that churches not instruct children, even if their parents desired reli-
gious training. Religious activity was restricted to churches regis-
tered with the states."' 7 During the 1920s, thousands of church lead-
ers were imprisoned and murdered by the government. In the 1930s,
Stalin closed more than 10,000 churches, and denied registration to
new ones as was required by law. During the purges of the 1930s,
scarcely a priest or pastor remained actively at his post; most who
tried were imprisoned." a"
During World War II, the Soviet regime needed the support of
the Russian Orthodox Church in the struggle with Germany. Despite
antagonistic relations with the government, Orthodox churches asked
their parishioners to go to the defense of the country. In September
1943, Russian Orthodoxy was rewarded for its support in the form
of less repression. It was allowed to elect its own patriarch and open
a few seminaries; it received recognition as a judicial person; and it
was given back some churches that had been previously shut
down.' 8 9
After 1955, the Church leaders helped Soviet foreign policy by
holding frequent meetings with Christian leaders in the West. How-
ever, in 1959, for reasons that are not very clear, the Khrushchev
government began a new era of massive repression of the Church. 9 '
By 1962, it was estimated that only half the Orthodox churches ex-
isting in 1959 were still open. Monasteries and seminaries were
closed, and some church officials and priests were jailed for economic
crimes or for preaching religious doctrines considered to endanger
the public welfare.' 9' This particular persecution ended in 1964, and
the Orthodox Church and the Soviet state now exist in an uneasy
modus vivendi.1
92
In addition to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catho-
lic Church also exists in an uneasy state within the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union and the Roman Catholic Church are natural ene-
mies for several reasons. Both are international movements that at
times claim that their world view is the absolute truth. Furthermore,
the Communist Party believes that the Catholicism of Soviet nation-
als hinders their acceptance of communist philosophy. 93 Between
1919 and 1925, the government imprisoned numerous members of
the Catholic hierarchy. Further, the massive repression that hit the
187. Id.; see also M. BATES, supra note 16, at 2-8.
188. LIBERTY, supra note 183, at 19.
189. Id.
190. Supra note 183.
191. Id.
192. Lucey, supra note 183, at 16.
193. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Eighteenth Semiannual Report by the President to the Com-
mission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final
Act, October 1, 1984-April 1, 1985, Special Rep. No. 130, at 6 (1985).
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Russian Orthodox Church between 1929 and 1932 did not spare the
Catholic Church. After World War II, the Soviet government jailed
or exiled about half of the Catholic clergy in' Latvia and Lithuania,
and put to death over a thousand Ukranian Catholic priests. Follow-
ing Stalin's death, most of the priests exiled in the immediate post-
war period received amnesty, together with most other political
prisoners. 9 "
In Lithuania, the Roman Catholic Church has proved remarka-
bly durable, both in membership and structure. "" Though they
freely conduct Mass, Catholic priests in Lithuania are frequently ar-
rested for teaching catechism to children and preparing them for
First Communion. 190 Government officials in the Soviet Socialist Re-
public close the churches at will. Since 1972, the underground publi-
cation Chronicle, in an unbroken stream of information that the au-
thorities have been unable to suppress, has informed the world about
religious persecution in Lithuania.
197
In addition to the Catholics in Lithuania, Ukranian Catholics in
1983, influenced by the Polish Pope in Rome, began to present their
case to the Soviet government and the world. Isoyf Terelya and
others formed the "Action Group for the Defense of the Rights of
Believers and the Church." 98 In 1984, more than 900 people surren-
dered or burned their passports in an organized act of civil
disobedience."
While many Roman Catholics have been persecuted for their
beliefs, the religious group most persecuted is the Baptists. 0 ° State
194. W. KOLARZ, RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION Ch. 5 (1962).
195. LIBERTY, supra note 183, at 27. A united population has kept 574 churches open,
and the number of seminarians has doubled since Khrushchev was Premier. Id.
196. See, e.g, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1971, at 5; N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28 1977, at 6; THE
TABLET (London) 233:610, June 23, 1979.
197. LIBERTY, supra note 183, at 19.
198. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE supra note 193, at 6. Terelya wrote to the Ukrainian Commu-
nist Party Central Committee:
Despite the prognoses of some Party members, we are living, growing, and
triumphing. The trials and persecution suffered by Catholics in the Ukraine have
strengthened us even more in the faith and have given us the opportunity to
sound the depth's of God's providence. I can state without exaggeration that
there is nothing greater than to die as a Catholic in a Communist prison.
LIBERTY, supra note 183, at 26. Isoyf Terelya was arrested on February 8, 1985 on charges of
anti-Soviet activity. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 193, at 6. In August 1985, Isoyf Terelya
was sentenced to seven years in a strict regime labor camp plus five years internal exile for
founding the Action Group and for his involvement with the Chronicle. In his verdict, the
judge announced that this harsh sentence should serve as an example to those who failed to
grasp "the seriousness of the situation." Terelya was sent to Camp 36, commonly known as a
"death camp." Terelya was released from prison camp in February 1987, but no further de-
tails of his release or present whereabouts are known. Christian Rescue Effort for the Emanci-
pation of Dissidents, Creed Priority Case Report 36 (March 1987) [hereinafter Creed
Report].
199. LIBERTY, supra note 183, at 27 (citing the third Chronicle).
200. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 19. Since 1983, at least 300 Soviet religious
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persecution has caused Baptists and evangelicals to scatter to remote
areas of the country and has divided the Baptist church."'1 In 1961,
the government forced the All-Union Council of Evangelical Chris-
tians and Baptists (AUCECB) to accept new regulations limiting the
rights of the church to evangelize, even in the context of official ser-
vices. 202 Failure of the Baptist leadership to offer effective resistance
to these measures led to the emergence of an independent opposition
group, the Reform Baptists. This group has shown a high degree of
organization and determination in the face of what is now more than
a quarter of a century of state opposition. As a result, the AUCECB
has received such concessions as being allowed to print the Baptist
edition of the Bible in limited quantities.0 3
The Reform Baptists, although not differing from the AUCECB
on theological grounds, are more assiduous proselytizers and demand
less state control over individual Baptist churches. Much of their
conduct is in clear violation of the Soviet criminal law. 204 For exam-
believers have been arrested, and approximately one half are cases involving "dissenting" Bap-
tists. As of October 1986, there were 400 known cases of religious believers being imprisoned
for participating in so-called unauthorized religious ceremonies. U.S. STATE DEPT., Human
Rights and Soviet-American. Relations, Current Pol'y No. 882, at 2 (1986).
201. Lucey, supra note 183, at 17.
202. LBERTY, supra note 183, at 26.
203. Id.
204. There exists six articles of the Soviet criminal codes which make it possible. for
Soviet authority to ignore the constitutional and other legal devices for protecting human
rights. They are:
Article 64: Defines as an act of treason "flight abroad or refusal to return
from abroad to the U.S.S.R.".
Article 70: Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda. Agitation or propa-
ganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime
or committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state, or the
circulation, for the same purpose, of slanderous fabrication which defame the
Soviet state and social system, or the circulation or preparation or keeping, for
the same purpose, of literature of such content, shall be punished by deprivation
of freedom for a term of 6 months to 7 years, with or without additional exile for
a term of 2 to 5 years, or by exile for a term of 2 to 5 years.
Article 72: Organizational Activity Directed to Commission of Especially
Dangerous Crimes against the State and also Participation in Anti-Soviet Orga-
nizations. Organizational activity directed to the preparation or commission of
especially dangerous crimes against the state, or to the creation of an organiza-
tion which has as its purpose the commission of such crimes, or participation in
an anti-Soviet organization, shall be punished in accordance with Articles 64-71
of the present code.
Article 142: Violation of Laws on Separation of Church and State and of
Church and School. The violation of laws on the separation of church and state
and of school and church shall be punished by correctional tasks for a term not
exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding 50 roubles.
Article 190-1: Circulation of Fabrications known to be False which Defame
Soviet State and Social System. The systematic circulation in an oral form of
fabrications known to be false which defame the Soviet state and social system
and, likewise, the preparation or circulation in written, printed or any other form
of works of such content shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term
not exceeding 3 years, or by correctional tasks for a term not exceeding one
year, or by a fine not exceeding 100 roubles.
Article 227: Infringement of Person and Rights of Citizens under Appear-
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pie, they refuse to register with the state. By teaching Bible classes,
by preaching in public places, and by claiming that this world is not
of much importance, they have been held to have violated Article
227.2o5
Perhaps the most beleaguered of the officially recognized reli-
gious communities are the Jews. When the Bolsheviks came into
power one of the customs of the Russian Empire they wished to
eradicate was anti-Semitism. 206 But even during the early days of
Bolshevism, overtly religious Jews suffered from disabilities similar
to those afflicting other religious groups. Jewish religious schools
were closed in the 1920s, and periodic efforts were made to prevent
Jews from keeping the Sabbath and celebrating festivals such as
Passover or Yom Kippur.207 In 1959, a new campaign against Juda-
ism commenced, with the state closing down many synagogues and
punishing persons who baked matzot.208 A campaign against "specu-
lators" in the early 1960s was anti-Semitic: Jewish offenders were
labelled by the government, and a majority of those eventually exe-
cuted were Jews.20 9
As of 1986, only sixty-nine synagogues remained open, com-
pared with 5,000 in 1917. The mass imprisonment of rabbis in the
1930s as Nazi spies and the government's refusal to allow a yeshiva
to train new rabbis until 1956 have led to a serious shortage of
trained religious leaders.2 10 Except for the publication of a few cal-
endars and prayer books in 1956, no Jewish literature has been
printed since 1917.211 The study of the Hebrew language is prohib-
ited as a "Zionist" activity. 2
Many Soviet Jews desire to emigrate to Israel, but the Soviet
Union does not want to lose the services of its Jewish scientists, an-
tagonize allied Arab states, or see other minority groups clamoring
to leave. Initially, it allowed only a few hundred Jews to exit each
ance of Performing Religious Ceremonies. The organizing or directing of a
group, the activity of which, carried on under the appearance of preaching reli-
gious beliefs and performing religious ceremonies, is connected with the causing
of harm to citizens' health or with any other infringements of the person or
rights of citizens, or with the inducing of citizens to refuse social activity or
performance of civic duties, or with the drawing of minors into such groups,
shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding 5 years or
by exile for a similar term with or without confiscation of property.
AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, Prisoners of Conscience in the U.S.S.R.: Their Treatment and Con-
ditions, 7-8 (1976).
205. Id.
206. S. BARON, THE RUSSIAN JEW UNDER TSARS AND SOVIETS 168-80 (1976).
207. LIBERTY, supra note 183, at 27.
208. S. BARON, supra note 206, at 290.
209. Id. at 291.
210. LIBERTY, supra note 183, at 27.
211. Id.; Lucey, supra note 183, at 18
212. Id.; see also S. BARON, supra note 206, at 289-90.
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year. In 1979, an all-time high of 51,300 Jews were allowed to
leave.2 13 Since then, however, Jewish emigration has dropped to 800
or fewer per month.
2 14
All the laws discussed apply to all religious groups in the
U.S.S.R. In essence, these laws limit rights of churches and syna-
gogues to conduct religious services and also prevent them from
proselytizing, performing traditional rites, forming discussion groups,
and conducting religious instructional classes. They thus become
weapons that the Soviet state can use against religious groups. 15 In
addition, the government holds power over religious groups because
no congregation may be organized without its consent and since the
churches are dependent on the state for permission to print litera-
ture, acquire real estate or personal property. However, the most po-
tent device the polity uses against persons who have religious beliefs
and wish to display them publicly is a very simple one: no member of
the Communist Party may participate in religious ceremonies."1
Since political power and professional success require Party member-
ship, Soviet citizens who wish to be overtly religious are almost auto-
matically denied access to important offices and jobs. 1
The Soviet Union's present position on freedom of religion is
best characterized as simple but systematic repression. Although be-
lievers are left alone on the whole, they are denied entry into posi-
tions of responsibility. Moreover, Jews and Reform Baptists at one
time or another, even during periods of moderation, have been the
victims of persecution and have had severe limitations placed on the
exercise of their faith. 1
213. R. VINCENT, supra note 82, at 81 n.37; see generally S. BARON, supra note 196, at
316-321.
214. N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1987, at A23, col. 5 (reported less than 100 Jews were
allowed to emigrate during each of the first three months of 1987); but see Schweid, Some
Progress on Rights Seen, The Sentinel, Carlisle, Pa., Oct. 31, 1987, at B7, col. I (reports that
during the latter part of 1987, 700 to 800 Jews were leaving monthly, 13,000 Jews have been
waiting since the 1970s, and of the 1,500 Jews who applied in 1987 for exist visas, 200 have
been granted).
215. See generally AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, Religious Prisoners of Conscience in the
U.S.S.R., (July 1986).
216. THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITS LAWS, supra note 182, at 210.
217. See, e.g., "Let the Sighing of the Prisoner Come Before Thee" 5 0. 31-33 (1984)
(discusses cases of employment discrimination on the basis of religious belief).
218. In recent months Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev has hinted at relaxation of
government restrictions regarding worship and emigration. See LIBERTY, supra note 183, at
17, 27 and N.Y. TIMES, supra note 215, at 1. The Soviet government has become increasingly
concerned with the media's representation of religious persecution within its boundaries. The
government believes it can effect favorable deals with the West by efficiently manipulating
constraints on Western decision-makers. Whether the verbal assertions of a freer society will
result in a sustained policy of a tolerant religious practice or is just a temporary cosmetic
tactic, only time will determine. It is worth noting, however, that for the first time in more
than fifty years, Kosher food is now available in Moscow, imported in regular shipments from
Hungary. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1987 at B3, col. 1. For the first time in forty years, the Rus-
sian Orthodox church has been allowed to receive Bibles from abroad. The Stockholm-based




Although seven years have passed since the adoption by consen-
sus of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intoler-
ance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the practices
against which the Declaration was directed are still evident in vary-
ing forms and degrees. However, the principle of religious liberty at
least in some modified form, has been affirmed by most every na-
tional government as a part of its law.21 9 The outright denial of reli-
gious liberty is now viewed everywhere, with the exception of Alba-
nia,"' as morally and legally unacceptable. Guarantees of religious
liberty, even if highly restricted, now appear in most states' constitu-
tions, including those of socialist governments that often espouse
anti-religion and commitment to atheism. 21 While there is a wide
divergence between the religious freedom proclaimed in the constitu-
tions of states and the international instruments regarding religious
liberty and its implementation by governments, the truth is that even
in those countries in which religious liberty is by no means descrip-
tive of actual conditions, the principle of religious liberty now has
normative value.
IV. Strategies for Closing the Gap Between Principle and Practice
Let the groans of the prisoners come before thee; according
to thy great power preserve those doomed to die! Return seven-
fold into the bosom of our neighbors the taunts with which they
have taunted thee, 0 Lord!222
Two approaches have been proposed within the international
community for bringing the practices of states into accord with the
principle of religious liberty. One approach emphasizes the creation
of a covenant; the other emphasizes education.
A. Creating a Covenant
The drafting of a convention on the elimination of all forms of
religious intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief
Bibles to the Soviet Union. READING TIMES, Reading Pa., Nov. 25, 1987, at 28, col. 4. See
also U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE SYSTEMATIC REPRESSION OF SOVIET JEWS, Cur. Pol'y No. 878,
at 3 (1986); The Sounds of Freedom, TIME, Feb. 23, 1987, at 52; Schweid, supra note 203, at
B7, col. 2; A Day in the Depths of the Gulag, TIME, March 9, 1987, at 52.
219. K. Vasak, I THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 82 (1982).
220. See Prifti, Albania-Towards an Atheist Society, in Religion and Atheism in THE
U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE 388-404 (B. Bociurkiw and J. Strong eds. 1975); Tonnies,
Religious Persecution in Albania, 10 RELIGION IN COMMUNIST LANDS 242-55 (1982).
221. See, e.g., UKRANIAN S.S.R. CONST. arts. 32, 50; CZECHOSLOVAK CONST. art. 32;
U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 52.
222. Psalm 79:11-12.
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has been suggested as a logical follow-up to the 1981 Declaration.22
Such a convention could incorporate the principles and rules of the
Declaration on Religious Intolerance, including a definition of reli-
gion, a prohibition against discrimination on grounds of religion or
belief, and a definition of religious groups.224 It could also include
provisions setting forth: (1) the right not to have a religion or belief;
(2) the right to change religion or belief; (3) the right to free access
to holy places; and (4) the right of parents, as the primary sources of
moral education for children, to provide them with instruction on
religion or belief without state or other external interference. Fur-
ther, the convention might include implementation machinery pat-
terned along the lines established in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,225 or other instruments such as the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination226 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women.227
While the drafting of a convention would appear to be the next
logical step to further establish the principle of religious liberty in
international law and to force states to conform their conduct to the
aspirations expressed in the Declaration on Religious Intolerance
through the use of a legally binding instrument, some profound lim-
its and weaknesses presently exist in the international documents in
this area that must be recognized. First, it is important to note that
not all states have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.228 Thus, the competence of the Human Rights
Commission to hear victims' complaints and the Optional Proto-
cols229 that provide for enforcement have largely been ignored.
Second, the only true method to ensure that all citizens are free
to practice their religion is for individual states to guarantee it to
their people through domestic legislation. As has been seen, most
countries do afford such rights in their national law. The problem of
223. See supra notes 45, 65 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITS LAWS, supra note 182, at 211 (Jews
are a separate race/nationality in the U.S.S.R.); see also 1981 U.N.Y.B. 880-1 (discusses con-
flicts between states in the drafting of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief).
225. CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT, supra note 20, at art. 48, 49 (ratified by individ-
ual states and in effect after thirty-five have notified Secretary-General).
226. 660 U.N.T.S. 195, part III (elaborate procedures including requirement of ratifica-
tion by 27 states before effective, right to make reservations, and procedures for denunciation).
227. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1980), Part V, cited in 19 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 33 (1980) (elaborate procedures including the establishment of special
committee to oversee the progress made in implementation; twenty states must ratify before
effective).
228. Report of the Human Rights Comm. 41 U.N. GAOR at 102-106, U.N. Doc. A/
41/40 (1986) (eighty-three states have acceded to or ratified the covenant, thirty-seven have
ratified the Optional Protocol).
229. See infra notes 236 and 238 and accompanying text.
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religious persecution does not, however, derive from transparently
anti-religious legislation. In fact, as illustrated by the practice of the
Soviet Union, one mark of a sophisticated totalitarian state is that it
postures its regulations concerning religious practice in neutral, non-
religious terms.23 0 Only primitive states are so bold as to openly as-
sault religious liberty. Therefore, formal protections of religious lib-
erty provided in a convention might well be helpless against a state's
concern with the alleged detrimental effects of religious practice on
the welfare of the nation. Consequently, it is necessary to probe be-
yond the formal protections of religion afforded by the state and
question criminal and administrative laws and procedures that effec-
tively limit religious liberty.
Third, the limits placed on religious liberty because of concern
over "public order, health, and morals" provide a further leaky valve
through which religious liberty can flow. Given, for example, the use
by the U.S.S.R. of mental hospitals for treating dissidents,2"' it does
not take much imagination to see that the use of the concept of
"health" can be quite elusive in an Orwellian future. Likewise, in the
United States, some jurisdictions have adopted conservator statutes
that may be used to attack new religions and that employ psycholog-
ical jargon to describe the commitments and, often, counter-culture
ideals of the convert.23 2 These statutes, designed to permit and pro-
230. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
231. AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 206, at 3; Schweid, supra note 209; A State
Program of Physical and Psychological Abuse, AMNESTY INT'L BULL. no. 6 (Fall 1985).
232. See, e.g., sections 1800 and 1801 of the California Probate Code which states:
If the need therefor is established to the satisfaction of the court and the
other requirements of this chapter are satisfied, the court may appoint:
(a) A conservator of the person or estate of an adult, or both.
(b) A conservator of the person of a minor who is married or whose
marriage has been dissolved.
CAL. PROBATE CODE § 1880 (West 1981).
Subject to Section 1800:
(a) A conservator of the person may be appointed for a person who is una-
ble properly to provide for his or her personal needs for physical health, food,
clothing, or shelter, except as provided for such person as described in subdivi-
sion (d).
(b) A conservator of the estate may be appointed for a person who is sub-
stantially unable to manage his or her own financial resources or resist fraud or
undue influence, except as provided for such person as described in subdivision
(d). Substantial inability may not be proved solely by isolated incidents of negli-
gence or improvidence.
(c) A conservator of the person and estate may be appointed for a person
described in subdivisions (a) and (b).
(d) A limited conservator of the person or of the estate, or both, may be
appointed for a developmentally disabled adult.
(1) Such limited conservatorships shall be utilized only as necessary
to promote and protect the well-being of the individual, shall be designed
to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and indepen-
dence of the individual, and shall be ordered only to the extent necessi-
tated by the individual's proven mental and adaptive limitations.
(2) The conservatee of the limited conservator shall not be presumed
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vide for deprogramming, are frighteningly similar to the Soviet
"treatment" of dissidents.13  Like "health," the "public order" ex-
ception is another subterfuge for religious intolerance. Indeed, the
tendency of an autocratic state or agency is always to find its own
interest self-authenticating, compelling and prevailing.
Fourth, any future convention must not permit the principle of
religious liberty to descend to mere religious toleration. Religious lib-
erty is more than mere permission to use a piece of property upon
which religious persons may carry out their lives; rather, it is the
right to participate fully and vigorously in a public life in which their
values and beliefs play a vital part. This means that religious liberty
does not rest on the irrelevance of religion, but on the relevance of
faith, moral life, conscience, and commitment to the life of the state.
There is, in effect, a powerful state interest in protecting religious
life even when a function of that life is to call the state's policies and
practices into question. 3'
Fifth, in order for any convention to be successful it must be
enforceable. Presently, international law provides that each state
must voluntarily incorporate the right to religious freedom into its
national legislation and assure its adherence. 3" General interna-
tional protection currently rests upon the Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights and its Optional Protocol. The Protocol enables the
Human Rights Committee to receive and consider claims of alleged
to be incompetent and shall retain all legal and civil rights except those
which by court order have been designated as legal disabilities and have
been specifically granted to the limited conservator.
(3) The intent of the Legislature, as expressed in Section 4501 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, that developmentally disabled citizens of
this state receive services resulting in more independent, productive, and
normal lives and that such services shall be the underlying mandate of
this division in its application to adults alleged to be developmentally
disabled.
CAL. PROBATE CODE §§ 1801 (West 1981). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 851 (West.
Supp. 1987) which states:
When it is represented to the court upon verified petition of any relative or
friend, that any person is insane, or from any cause mentally incompetent to
manage his property, the court shall cause notice, by any means deemed proper
to the judge, to be given to some known near relative of such alleged insane or
incompetent person who is not the petitioner, of the time and place of hearing
the case, not less than five (5) days before the time so appointed, and such in-
sane or incompetent person, if able to attend, must be produced before the court
on the hearing. The relative to be given such notice shall be designated by the
judge. If there be no known relative, near or remote, or if the whereabouts of all
relatives be unknown or unascertainable from available sources, the petition
shall so allege.
For discussion of case law, see Annotation, Validity of Guardianship Proceeding Based on
Brainwashing of Subject By Religious, Political, or Social Organization, 44 A.L.R. 4th 1207
(1986).
233. See supra note 232.
234. Henry, Religious Freedom, 5 Q. 8 (1984).
235. See supra note 77 and text.
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victims of violations of religious freedom.236 After reaching a conclu-
sion, on the basis of materials submitted by the individual complain-
ant and by the state, the Committee communicates its views to par-
ties. Thus, only individuals themselves, and not the groups or
organizations of which they may be members are permitted to deal
with the Committee. This forecloses the participation of organiza-
tions that have been established with the special aim of protecting
people whose human rights have been violated.2" 7 Such organizations
are more capable than any individual can possibly be at finding nec-
essary materials, researching legal questions, conducting preliminary
investigations, contacting the Committee, and initiating procedures
that protect human rights. Their activities could be especially signifi-
cant when a victim of a violation has reason to abstain from com-
plaints to agencies of the United Nations because of some peculiar
conditions in his country. But owing to the defect of the present gen-
eral covenants, organizations seem juridically unable to help a vic-
tim, and individuals themselves generally seem too weak to actually
use their formal opportunities for redress. This fact creates an urgent
need for change and any future convention should address it. A duty
should be imposed upon the Committee to act on petitions of non-
governmental organizations and groups, in addition to its existing
obligation to act on individuals' petitions.238
Finally, any future covenant should expressly encourage states
to use non-military force to coerce other states into honoring the
right of religious freedom. The use of non-military economic force
for the purpose of enforcing human rights is not a breach of interna-
tional law, but is a fulfillment of the obligations arising under the
236. See OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND PO-
LITICAL RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc.
A/6316, at art. 1 (1966).
237. For example, Amnesty International, Christian Response International, Keston
College Research and Study Center, Baptist World Alliance, World Jewish Congress, and
International League for Human Rights, are such organizations.
238. Such a provision could be based on either the EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra note
79, art. 25 or the AMERICAN CONVENTION, supra note 79, art. 61. According to the European
Convention, the Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization, or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the contracting parties of the rights set forth
in the Convention. The right to bring a case before the Court, however, belongs to the Com-
mission and contracting parties only, and not to individuals, their groups, or organizations.
EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra note 79, at art. 48.
The American Convention introduces the same rule for the Inter-American Court. See
AMERICAN CONVENTION, supra note 79, at art. 61, para. 1. But the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Commission differs in some ways. Proceedings in the Commission can also be initi-
ated by any person or group of persons complaining of violations of the Convention by states
parties even if other persons beside themselves were victims of violations. Id. at art. 44. Similar
complaints from a non-governmental entity, however, may be received only on the condition
that it has been "legally recognized in one or more member states" of the Inter-American
Organization. Id.
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United Nations Charter a.2 9 The world community, through the
United Nations Security Council, has the right to assert and main-
tain international obligations and world order. The Security Council,
therefore, would be well within its powers if it characterized any
gross violation of religious freedom as a "breach" of, and a "threat"
to, world peace, and in contravention of international law. Upon
such characterization, the Council would have the authority to in-
voke Article 41240 of the Charter against the violators, and demand
that other signatory states implement whatever measures the Coun-
cil decided were necessary. Of course, the problem that is always
encountered when seeking to invoke the power in the Security Coun-
cil, is that many of the states that violate the right to religious free-
dom are supported by member states possessing veto power.
B. Domestic Initiative and Self-Education
An alternative and/or complimentary approach to the drafting
of a separate convention is to concentrate on urging states, them-
selves, to adopt appropriate constitutional, legislative, judicial, and
administrative measures to ensure that all rights set forth in the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief be adequately and
fully protected by national law. National court decisions are more
likely to ensure religious freedom than the mere existence of legal
provisions in domestic law that may not be effective in practice.
Arguably, a separate convention on the elimination of religious
intolerance is not strictly necessary because standards are already
firmly established at the international level, although they are not
always followed. The binding obligations assumed by states under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are explicit
in this area.24' Opponents of a new convention dedicated solely to
religious freedom argue that states should be encouraged to ratify
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Op-
tional Protocol, which requires periodic reporting by all states, in-
stead of imposing on them the heavy burden of adhering to yet an-
other reporting system established by a separate convention.
Using this approach in combination with political pressure, an
extensive mass media campaign would be used to educate individuals
239. The U.N. Charter prohibits the threat of the use of force only when such methods
violate the Charter or the purposes espoused by the Charter. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
However, the promotion of human rights is one of the major purposes underlying the Charter.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3.
240. U.N. CHARTER, art. 41 provides: "The Security Council may decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it
may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures."
241. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6:2
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
everywhere of the international standards protecting their right to
religious freedom. States and United Nations agencies should dis-
tribute texts of the international instruments on human rights as
widely as possible. Furthermore, international standards for the pro-
tection of freedom of religion or belief should be kept under continu-
ous review in light of experience.2"2
This strategy for eliminating religious intolerance and securing
religious freedom for all people is the method that the member states
of the United Nations are presently employing.24 In 1986, the
Human Rights Commission, by a vote of twenty-six to five, with
twelve abstentions, established the position of rapporteur on religious
intolerance. " It is the ongoing duty of the rapporteur to examine
incidents and governmental actions world-wide that are inconsistent
with the provisions of the Declaration on the Elimination of Reli-
gious Intolerance and to recommend remedial measures.24
V. Conclusion
It is regrettable that, at the end of the twentieth century, reli-
gious intolerance and bigotry should remain, as they have over the
centuries, a prime cause of division within and between states. Reli-
gious liberty belongs to the realm of domestic and international law.
The existing state of religious freedom is known all over the world.
Any suggestions about its improvement must be attentively studied
and seriously discussed. But it would be a gross mistake to think that
even perfect law would alone ensure the desired results, without
other methods and means. Unfortunately, contemporary history
knows many instances when states, which have ratified existing in-
ternational covenants and declared recognition of human rights in
domestic law, have disregarded their own duties and obligations.
Under such circumstances, neither established legal regulation nor
introduced legal protection will have any effect.
In modern times, however, the movement in favor of religious
liberty is so authoritative and influential that even the most impu-
dent transgressors try to conceal the criminality of their behavior,
242. As was discovered in the comparative analysis, even in those states that have rati-
fied and supported all the legal instruments in this area, religious liberty as articulated in the
1981 Declaration is not fully or always realized.
243. See 40 U.N. GAOR C.3 (47th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/ SR. 47 (1985); 40 U.N.
GAOR C.3 (50th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 50 (1985); 40 U.N. GAOR C.3 (52nd mtg.),
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 52 (1985); 40 U.N. GAOR C.3 (58th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 58
(1985); 40 U.N. GAOR C.3 (60th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 60 (1985); 41 U.N. GAOR
C.3 (44th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 44 (1986); 41 U.N. GAOR C.3 (45th mtg.), U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR. 45 (1986); 40 U.N. GAOR (Sem. on Religious Intolerance Report) at 25-28,
U.N. Doc. A/361 (1985).
244. United Nations, DEPT. OF STATE BULL. Oct. 1986, at 62.
245. Id.
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and, as often as not, are compelled to capitulate under the pressure
of irrefutable exposure and universal blame. 46 This opens the way to
efficacious help to victims of inhumane activity when law has become
powerless to attain its designated goals. Those states that have made
violations of religious freedom their everyday policy must be sur-
rounded by universal contempt. And if the joint efforts of progressive
humanity do not re-educate confirmed state violators, they will at
least be able to diminish the number or mitigate the force of viola-
tions. Together with legal regulations, sooner or later this will bring
the success so necessary for the Rozkalns z4 of this world and so im-
portant for humankind.
Then we thy people, the flock of thy pasture, will give
thanks to thee forever; from generation to generation we will
recount thy praise.48
Scott A. Burr
246. See supra note 219.
247. As a result of world-wide attention and increased pressure, the Soviet Union re-
leased ninety-four prisoners of conscience in February 1987. The release had much to do with
international politics and the clamor raised by concerned organizations and persons in the
West. Prayer vigils, letters, congressional representations, and demonstrations all played a part
in convincing the Soviets that the release of prisoners of conscience would win them good will,
or at least, a lessening of international bad press. As this Comment was prepared for print it
was announced by the Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents that Janis
Rozkalns was among those "political" prisoners released. No further details are known at this
time about his release. Creed Report, supra note 198, at 28; see also The Sounds of Freedom,
supra note 208, at 52; A Day in the Depths of the Gulag, supra note 208, at 52.
248. Psalm 79:13.
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